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ABSTRACT
WHO FRAMED SILICON VALLEY AND HOLLYWOOD:
NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF REGIONAL BUSINESS CLUSTERS
IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
by Frank Michael Russell
In this study, coverage was examined of Silicon Valley technology 
companies and Hollywood entertainment companies in the San Jose Mercury 
News, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune.  Previous work has suggested 
that newspaper coverage decisions are influenced by the communities that news 
organizations serve, journalistic values that can favor corporate interests, and the 
work of experienced framers of media messages.
Silicon Valley and Hollywood are two well-known examples of regional 
industrial agglomerations, which are clusters of adjacent related businesses that 
are a powerful form of organization for the deployment of capital and labor.  
California’s technology and entertainment companies have developed strong 
geographical links and have had a substantial influence on global culture.
This study involved a quantitative analysis of business news coverage from 
the three newspapers and employment data for their metro areas from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Support was found for a connection between the 
presence of a strong regional agglomeration and the content of business news 
coverage.  Support also was found for an interest regardless of a newspaper’s 
location in covering large technology companies—particularly Apple, Google, and 
Facebook—that are known as effective framers of media messages.
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Introduction
This study involved newspaper coverage of Apple Inc., Google Inc., 
Facebook, Inc., The Walt Disney Co., and other major technology and 
entertainment employers in California.  This is a worthy topic of study because 
these large corporations are economic and cultural forces, globally and within 
California’s two largest population centers.  These companies have strong 
business connections and operate in a media, economic, and cultural 
environment that has been transformed by new technologies such as the Internet.
The entertainment industry combined with the tourism industry is the 
largest employer in Los Angeles County (Hozic, 1999; Kyser, Sidhu, Ritter, & 
Guerra, 2010).  The technology sector is the largest employer in Santa Clara 
County (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d., b), the most populous county in 
Northern California’s Silicon Valley, which stretches from San Jose north to San 
Francisco.  Economists and geographers suggest such regional industrial 
agglomerations, also known as business clusters, are a powerful form of 
organization for the deployment of capital and labor.  This study involved news 
coverage of corporations in the Silicon Valley and Hollywood business clusters by  
large newspapers in those regions and by a large newspaper in a city without such 
a major employment agglomeration.
The entertainment and technology industries have roles in a number of 
public policy issues.  In recent decades, Hollywood and Silicon Valley have 
emerged as important forces in California’s economy, replacing the military and 
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aerospace sector as dominant employers (Hozic, 1999; Porter, 1998; Scott, 2004; 
Storper & Christopherson, 1987).  Hollywood and Silicon Valley companies often 
operate in monopolistic markets.  Early in their history, Hollywood studios 
operated as vertically integrated organizations in a concentrated oligopoly, then 
adopted a “flexible specialization” model but retained oligopolistic control of 
their industry (Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; Storper & 
Christopherson, 1987).  They have grown to become parts of large media 
conglomerates that often own news organizations (Bagdikian, 2004).  In the 
technology industries, a preference for standards can lead to monopolistic power 
for successful companies (Boyd-Barrett, 2006; Rysman, 2009).  The 
entertainment and technology industries both try to influence public policy, 
particularly intellectual property laws providing copyright and patent protections 
as well as legislation governing the use of anti-piracy technology (Ayres & 
Williams, 2004; Barlow, 2005; Gillespie, 2006).
Mass communications researchers, including Bagdikian (2004), have 
suggested that ownership of media organizations by large conglomerates such as 
Disney, News Corp., Time Warner, and Viacom influences the public agenda and 
news coverage.  These media conglomerates have numerous business 
relationships and both shared and competing interests with Silicon Valley 
technology companies.
In this study, references to technology, media, and other companies in the 
San Jose Mercury News, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune were counted. 
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The data sets were analyzed for support for the hypothesis that the economic and 
cultural impact of Silicon Valley technology companies and Hollywood 
entertainment companies as well as the geographical links between them would 
be reflected in financial news coverage.  Mass communication researchers 
previously have examined news content and the framing of media messages 
related to the technology and entertainment industries.  In this study, an effort 
was made to contribute further to the field with an examination of news coverage 
of the technology and entertainment industries in an economic and geographical 
context, in part through the use of regional employment data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.
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Literature Review
Disney, Apple, and Pixar Animation Studios
Disney, founded in 1923, has grown to become one of the world’s largest 
media conglomerates (Bagdikian, 2004; Walt Disney Co., n.d., a).  Apple is a 
Silicon Valley computer and electronics manufacturer with a history of 
innovation (Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008; Goggin, 2009; Lohr, 
2010; West, 2005).  Pixar Animation Studios is a pioneer maker of computer 
animated feature films (Catmull, 2008; Telotte, 2008).  In 2006, Disney 
purchased Pixar for $7.4 billion (Barnes, 2008b).  The acquisition combined two 
pioneering forces in the film animation industry.  It also made Apple Chief 
Executive Officer and Pixar Chairman Steve Jobs—who had purchased Pixar in 
1986 from Star Wars filmmaker George Lucas—a member of Disney’s board of 
directors and the Southern California media conglomerate’s largest individual 
shareholder (Barnes, 2008b; Catmull, 2008; Telotte, 2008).
Disney.  Disney is one of the Big Five conglomerates, along with Time 
Warner, News Corp., Viacom, and Bertelsmann, that own most of the media 
outlets in the United States (Bagdikian, 2004).  These five companies operate 
with monopolistic power in the U.S. media marketplace.  “Technically,” 
Bagdikian (2004) wrote, “the dominant media firms are an oligopoly, the rule of 
a few in which any of the few, acting alone, can alter market conditions” (p. 5).  
Although many U.S. companies operate under monopolistic market conditions, 
Bagdikian (2004) wrote, “Media products are unique in one vital respect.  They 
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do not manufacture nuts and bolts: they manufacture a social and political 
world” (p. 9).
Among Disney’s media holdings are Walt Disney Studios, ABC, ESPN, the 
Disney Channel, Touchstone Pictures, Hollywood Records, and the Disneyland 
and Walt Disney World theme parks (Fabrikant, 1995; Scott, 2004; Walt Disney 
Co., n.d., a).  Disney aggressively uses its properties to promote the products of 
its other holdings, former CEO Michael Eisner noted in an interview with 
Wetlaufer (2000): “Synergy happens at Disney because it should.  Our products 
scream out for synergy.  . . .  There is not a single part of Disney where the left 
hand can’t wash the right” (p. 121).
Disney’s founder and namesake, Walt Disney, was a Missouri “country 
boy,” Bagdikian (2004) wrote, “who became an international phenomenon.  His 
creations are everywhere in the world” (p. 33).  Walt Disney, Bryman (1997) 
wrote, succeeded in the animation industry in part by creating Mickey Mouse, a 
star “with genuine character,” and by giving his company’s “cartoons clear, strong 
story lines” (p. 423).  The Disney brand is associated with values such as honesty 
and sincerity, Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons (2008) noted.  However, 
Bryman (1999) wrote, critics have pointed to “Disneyfication” as the process by 
which Disney takes an original work and creates a distorted version that is 
“instantly recognizable as a Disney product” (p. 27).  Lessig (2004) identified this 
process as “Walt Disney creativity” (p.24).  “Disney (or Disney, Inc.),” he wrote, 
“ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his own 
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extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of his 
culture” (p. 24).  Bryman (1999) identified “Disneyization” as the process by 
which society has become more like Disneyland or Walt Disney World, creating a 
themed, artificially friendly consumer culture in environments such as 
restaurants, shopping malls, and Las Vegas casinos.  Throughout the Cold War, 
Hebdige (2003) wrote, “virulently anti-Disney discourse” (p. 153) was directed 
against Walt Disney and his namesake company—and the capitalistic and 
“Disneyfied” family values they represented.
After Walt Disney died in 1966, Collis and Montgomery (2008) wrote, his 
company’s “powerful brand name survived almost two decades of benign 
neglect” (p. 145).  Disney later flourished under the leadership of Michael Eisner, 
who was CEO from 1984 to 2005 (Bagdikian, 2004; Barnes, 2008b; Collis & 
Montgomery, 2008; Walt Disney Co., n.d., b).  One of Eisner’s first decisions as 
CEO was to restore Disney’s animation legacy by committing $50 million for the 
production of Who Framed Roger Rabbit, which combined animation and live-
action filmmaking (Collis & Montgomery, 2008).  “Our brand is our greatest 
asset,” Eisner noted, “and we handle it with extreme care” (Wetlaufer, 2000, 
p. 120).
As early as the 1930s, Walt Disney emphasized the importance of 
technology to his company and the entertainment industry, Telotte (2008) noted: 
“Our business has grown with and by technical achievements,” Walt Disney said 
in 1938 to the Society of Motion Picture Engineers.  “Should this technical 
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progress ever come to a full stop, prepare for the funeral oration for our 
medium” (p. 179).  The Disney studio in its early days, Bryman (1997) wrote, 
“gained a reputation for cartoons of extremely high quality and 
innovativeness” (p. 424).  Walt Disney, Catmull (2008) wrote, “believed that 
when continual change, or reinvention, is the norm in an organization and 
technology and art are together, magical things happen” (p. 70).
Apple.  Apple, originally known as Apple Computer, was established in 
1976 by co-founders including Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak.  With the Apple II 
in 1977 and the Macintosh in 1984, West (2005) noted, Apple “became both the 
face of the PC revolution and Silicon Valley’s first global icon” (p. 2).  Apple 
entered a nearly fatal decline in the mid-1990s, burdened by a dysfunctional 
corporate culture and marketplace adoption of Microsoft’s Windows 95 operating 
system (West, 2005).
Apple’s fortunes began to turn around in 1997 as Steve Jobs, who had 
departed in 1985, returned as interim CEO, and the company developed 
innovative products such as the iMac computer (West, 2005).  “Apple,” 
Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons (2008) wrote, “has labored to cultivate a 
strong brand personality based on the ideas of nonconformity, innovation, and 
creativity” (p. 24).  Apple introduced the iPod music player in 2001, the iPhone in 
2007, and the iPad in 2010 (Goggin, 2009; Lohr, 2010).  “From computers to 
smartphones,” Lohr (2010) wrote, “Apple products are known for being stylish, 
powerful and pleasing to use.”  Until Jobs’ death in 2011, Newman (2011) noted, 
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he led Apple with a philosophy that the company’s products “brought to market 
not merely be great, they must be ‘insanely great.’ ”
Pixar Animation Studios.  In 1986, Jobs purchased what became Pixar 
Animation Studios from filmmaker George Lucas (Catmull, 2008; Telotte, 2008). 
Pixar, led by Ed Catmull, had been the computer graphics division of Lucas’ 
Industrial Light & Magic special effects shop (Catmull, 2008; Telotte, 2008).  
Jobs hired John Lasseter, a former Disney animator who was trained at the 
Disney-funded California Institute of the Arts, as Pixar’s creative leader.  “In the 
early 1990s,” Catmull (2008) wrote, “we were known as the leading technological 
pioneer in the field of computer animation.  Our years of R&D culminated in the 
release of Toy Story in 1995, the world’s first computer-animated feature 
film” (p. 65).  Popular Pixar films such as Toy Story were distributed by Disney.  
Pixar’s success—much like Disney’s, Catmull (2008) wrote—was built on a 
“swirling interplay between art and technology” (p. 70).
In 2005, Jobs broke off negotiations with Disney over a new distribution 
deal for Pixar, Barnes (2008b) wrote, after he “had bitterly clashed” with then-
Disney CEO Michael Eisner.  Negotiations resumed in 2006 and concluded with 
a merger agreement, Barnes (2008b) wrote, after new Disney CEO Robert Iger 
“agreed to an explicit list of guidelines for protecting Pixar’s creative culture,” 
including that Pixar would remain in Emeryville, near Silicon Valley’s technology 
cluster.  Iger asked Lasseter, who had directed Toy Story, and Catmull to help 
revive Disney’s animation operation (Catmull, 2008; Telotte, 2008).
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Google and Facebook
Google, founded in 1998 by Stanford University doctoral students Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin, is known as the world’s largest Internet search engine, but 
it makes a majority of its revenue from online advertising.  Google became a 
publicly traded company in 2004.  Its innovative approach to selling advertising 
by keywords has transformed the media marketplace (Google, n.d.; Lee, 2011).
Facebook, the social media site founded by Harvard University undergrad 
Mark Zuckerberg in 2004, has changed the way its members interact with 
friends, relatives, colleagues, and classmates.  It brings in revenue by selling 
advertising targeted to members who have disclosed detailed personal 
information to their Facebook friends and to the site itself (boyd & Ellison, 2008; 
Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Haythornwaite, 2005; Henderson & 
Bowley, 2010; Vorvoreanu, 2009).
Google.  By far the leading Internet search engine, Google fields 
hundreds of millions of queries each day, providing information about billions of 
Web pages.  Through its complex, proprietary search algorithms, Google controls 
how the Internet is perceived by much of the online audience (Pan et al., 2007).  
Google’s marketplace position is so dominant that “to google” has become a verb 
meaning to search for information on the Internet (Lee, 2011).  In addition to its 
flagship search engine, Google offers an array of free content and services such as 
Google News and Google Maps (Bui, 2010; Lee, 2011; Pan et al., 2007).
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As with many established media and newer Internet companies, Google 
makes money by selling advertising.  “It is a commercially supported site,” Lee 
(2011) noted, “and its economic survival depends on advertising revenue and a 
vast number of users” (p. 434).  Google has become extremely efficient at selling 
advertising, using a vertically integrated platform on which businesses bid to 
place their messages by keywords next to the results of Internet users’ queries on 
Google’s search engine.  Google controls every step of this process, Lee (2011) 
observed, and other companies cannot compete with Google to sell advertising on 
its platform.  Notably, Google places ads based in part on expected relevance, Lee 
wrote.  Even though the company may not necessarily deliver ads from the 
highest bidder, users are more likely to click on the messages they see, 
maximizing revenue for Google.  Lee contended that this process has allowed 
Google to create economic value from access to information:
Google sells what it claims to sell—information.  As an advertising agency, 
it sells keywords.  As a ratings company, it sells statistics of keywords.  As 
a content provider, it sells search indexes.  All these forms of information 
have exchange value because Google (along with other information 
companies) transforms information, which otherwise has no value, into 
commodities in the market. (p. 434)
Facebook.  Facebook is not the first social networking site.  Its 
predecessors, dating back as early as 1997, have included SixDegrees.com, 
LiveJournal, Friendster, and MySpace (boyd & Ellison, 2008).  Facebook initially 
restricted membership to students at Harvard and other elite universities, then 
expanded entry to anyone with an academic “.edu” email address.  The general 
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public was allowed to join Facebook in 2007, but by this time the site’s early 
college-age members had established, as Vorvoreanu (2009) noted, “a well-
defined Facebook college culture” (p. 68).  Facebook now claims more than a 
half-billion active members, and its founding was the subject of a Hollywood 
motion picture, The Social Network (Corliss, 2010).  
As boyd and Ellison (2008) noted, social media sites such as Facebook 
allow participants “to articulate and make visible their social networks” (p. 211)
and members primarily use social networking sites to communicate “with people 
who are already a part of their extended social network” (p. 211).  However, they 
also may use social networks to connect with people they don’t know very well—
but who may share common offline interests—or with total strangers 
(Haythornwaite, 2005; Henderson & Bowley, 2010).  Facebook makes money by 
selling targeted advertising based on highly personal information that its 
members would be reluctant to share with other third parties (Debatin et al., 
2009).  “Facebook and other social network sites pose severe risks to their users’ 
privacy,” Debatin et al. (2009) wrote.  “At the same time, they are extremely 
popular and seem to provide a high level of gratification to their users” (p. 87).
Although corporations and other organizations use social media to 
communicate directly with audiences, bypassing established mass media, this 
interaction is taking place on a neutral turf with its own cultural expectations 
rather than an online site under corporate control, Vorvoreanu (2009) noted:
11
A Facebook user does not log into Facebook with the expectation to 
interact with an organization.  So, although the technology makes it 
possible for organizations to interact with publics on Facebook, the social 
norms and expectations of Facebook culture create a context radically 
different from Web sites and blogs. (p. 71)
Hollywood and Silicon Valley: Regional Industrial Agglomerations
Hollywood and Silicon Valley are perhaps the best-known examples of 
what economists and geographers call regional industrial agglomerations, or 
clusters of related businesses (Porter, 1998; Storper & Christopherson, 1987).  In 
such agglomerations or clusters, related businesses locate near each other to take 
advantage of economies of scale and network effects.  This reduces risk and costs 
by allowing complex production work to be contracted out to specialized firms 
(Porter, 1998; Scott, 2004; Storper & Christopherson, 1987).  Furthermore, 
Porter (1998) wrote, “the proximity of companies and institutions in one location
—and the repeated exchanges among them—fosters better coordination and 
trust” (p. 80).
Employees in regions with such a business cluster reduce economic 
uncertainty by remaining close to potential employers, which in turn have access 
to a highly skilled labor force (Storper & Christopherson, 1987).  “The 
concentration of specialized economic activity in one place,” Scott (2004) wrote, 
“helps to promote processes of creativity and innovation via the constant 
interactions and mutual exchanges of information that occur between individuals 
within firms and across the system” (p. 195).  As Porter (1998) noted, “What 
12
happens inside companies is important, but clusters reveal that the immediate 
business environment outside companies plays a vital role as well” (p. 78).
Hollywood’s entertainment cluster.  “In geographic terms,” Scott 
(2004) noted, “Los Angeles is by far the most important center for the production 
of filmed entertainment in the United States, whether for television or theatrical 
exhibition” (p. 192).  In 1981, U.S. movie production, television production, and 
allied services work were highly concentrated in California—with 73 percent of 
movie production workers in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (Storper & 
Christopherson, 1987); within the region, most workers were concentrated in 
Hollywood and the San Fernando Valley.
In the 1990s, Hozic (1999) noted, the entertainment industry became 
Southern California’s largest employer, surpassing the previously dominant 
aerospace and military sector.  In addition to economies of scale, network effects, 
and labor market advantages, Scott (2004) noted, Southern California’s pre-
eminence in the entertainment industry “is reinforced by a series of institutional 
infrastructures in Hollywood, where dense webs of producers’ alliances, 
professional guilds and labor unions provide coordinating services and other 
advantages to the industry at large” (p. 195).  Specialized movie production firms 
have strong incentives to locate in Los Angeles:
By locating in the center of the motion picture industry, they increase the 
opportunity to obtain contracts.  The transactions (“deals”) associated with 
this process often require face-to-face contact.  Production companies and 
major studios encourage small firms to congregate in Los Angeles in order 
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to ease the managerial coordination associated with the production of a 
non-standardized product. (Storper & Christopherson, 1987, p. 112)
Oligopolistic control in Hollywood.  The Hollywood studios are 
unique in their transition, Lampel and Shamsie (2003) wrote, from “hierarchical 
and vertically integrated organizations” to a structure that is “flat” and 
“knowledge intensive rather than capital intensive,” relying heavily “on networks 
to mobilize critical resources” (p. 2190).  Very few business sectors made such an 
organizational change until at least the 1990s, but the entertainment industry 
transformed itself much earlier (Lampel & Shamsie, 2003).
From the 1920s to the 1940s, Hollywood’s major studios operated a 
concentrated oligopoly, controlling distribution to many of the nation’s theaters, 
employing production workers and signing actors to exclusive contracts (Storper 
& Christopherson, 1987).  Weakened by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Paramount 
Decision—which required studios to divest their theaters—and facing new 
competition from television, studios adopted a hybrid structure in the 1950s and 
1960s, making fewer films in-house while financing and distributing the work of 
independent producers (Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Storper & Christopherson, 1987).  
By the 1970s, studios emphasized financing and distribution, with production 
mostly contracted out to independent producers and subcontractors.  “In this 
entertainment industry complex,” Storper and Christopherson (1987) noted, 
“specialized production firms are combined and recombined as they work on 
various projects” (p. 107).
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Even as the motion picture industry moved toward what economists call 
flexible specialization, Aksoy and Robins (1992) wrote, “oligopolistic control 
never ceased to be a distinguishing feature of Hollywood” (p. 6).  The major 
studios, Storper and Christopherson (1987) noted, “continue to dominate 
financing and distribution, retaining effective control over product definition and 
marketing” (p. 107).  By 1990, five studios, Warner Bros., Disney, Universal, 
Paramount, and Twentieth Century Fox, had a combined 69.7 percent share of 
U.S. box-office receipts (Aksoy & Robins, 1992).  In the late 1990s, Ayres and 
Williams (2004) noted, “media outlets felt the urge to merge with content 
providers.  The strategy of the day was to create a multimedia conglomerate, 
including content providers such as movie studios and distribution channels such 
as TV broadcasting networks, cable systems, and telecoms” (p. 332).  The major 
studios, Scott (2004) wrote, “are steadily being integrated into even larger and 
more complex multinational conglomerates, both U.S.-owned and foreign-
owned” (p. 184).  The goal of “major communications conglomerates,” Aksoy and 
Robins (1992) wrote, “is to deepen and expand their control over the cultural 
industries” (p. 11).  Southern California’s entertainment industry is “at the center 
of an extensive system of national and international markets,” Scott (2004) 
wrote.  “It is hence at one and the same time highly localized as an apparatus of 
production and manifestly global in its overall reach and influence” (p. 193).
Silicon Valley’s technology cluster.  In Northern California, Silicon 
Valley technology companies such as Apple and Google, Turner (2009) noted, 
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have “proven to be extremely nimble at building alliances, making acquisitions 
and developing new and very popular products” (p. 78).
In the decades after World War II, the U.S. military monopolized 
information-technology research.  However, information technology became 
commercialized in the 1970s with the establishment of semiconductor startups in 
Silicon Valley, the invention of the computer microprocessor, and the emergence 
of consumer electronics manufacturers (Hozic, 1999).
Today, Turner (2009) wrote, large Silicon Valley employers such as Apple 
and Google and small technology startups operate in and embrace a bohemian-
style culture that models “the high-tech worker as a playful, emotionally 
integrated hipster and the corporate team as a cross between a family and a rock 
band” (p. 78).  In Silicon Valley, rapid industry change can bring high employee 
turnover and job losses, Turner (2009) noted, but workers adapt by “maintaining 
rich social networks” that are “a key factor in sustaining one’s 
employability” (p. 77).  In recent years, Turner (2009) noted, a “dramatic 
socialization” of labor has taken place in the technology sector:
Two accounts of this process have emerged: one focused on the rise of the 
Internet and online collaboration, and the other focused on the 
development of networked modes of doing business within and between 
firms.  Although they are rarely linked, when told together they suggest 
that the manufacture of information and IT is becoming entwined 
increasingly with the making of social worlds inside, outside and in 
between the boundaries of firms. (p. 76.)
In the technology marketplace, a preference for standards can lead to 
monopolistic power for successful corporations (Boyd-Barrett, 2006; Rysman, 
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2009).  Intel, for example, controlled 80 percent of the global computer 
microprocessor market in 2001, providing chips for computers that used 
Microsoft’s dominant Windows operating system (Boyd-Barrett, 2006).
Disney, the Entertainment Industry, and Technology
Throughout its history, Disney has included technological themes in its 
movies, television programming, and theme park attractions.  “Despite its 
frequent nostalgic evocations,” Telotte (2008) noted, “Disney has also, like no 
other American cultural institution, always been invested in the technological, 
and how it has effectively made the technological seem like a natural or 
complementary element of our world” (p. 7).  Disney has presented technological 
themes in movies such as 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, The Black Hole, Tron, 
and Monsters, Inc.—and in television programming such as Disney’s Man in 
Space series in the 1950s (Telotte, 2008).  Disneyland was conceived, Bryman 
(1999) wrote, “as a celebration of America’s past and as a paean to progress” 
(p. 31).  At Disney’s theme parks, Telotte (2008) noted, Main Street takes visitors 
on a trip through time, marking technological progress through the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, and leading to regions including Tomorrowland, which 
depicts a “technologically driven future” (p. 12).  At Walt Disney World, EPCOT’s 
two lands—Future World and World Showcase—link a “technological future,” 
Telotte (2008) wrote, with a “traditional cultural past” (p. 13).
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Disney and Hollywood’s other major studios have both embraced 
technology and feared its potential impact on their business.  As Hozic (1999) 
noted:
The relationship between the motion picture industry and technology has 
always been very ambivalent.  Producers resorted to technological 
innovation whenever the industry faced an internal or external crisis; still, 
they generally perceived it as a cheap substitute for talent or a gripping 
film narrative.  Distributors, on the other hand, distrusted any technology 
which they themselves did not control, and relied, mostly unsuccessfully, 
on ‘gimmicks’ such as Technicolor or 3-D to improve their position in the 
industry. (p. 291)
Throughout its history, Disney has used technology to differentiate itself 
from rivals (Bryman, 1997; Telotte 2008).  “To survive in an increasingly 
competitive environment,” Telotte (2008) wrote, Disney has “repeatedly had to 
innovate” (p. 5).  For example, Disney technicians developed the multiplane 
camera in the 1930s to add realistic animated movement to films such as Snow 
White and the Seven Dwarfs and Bambi (Bryman, 1997; Telotte, 2008).  For the 
theme parks, Telotte (2008) wrote, Disney gave animal and human characters 
lifelike sound and motion with Audio-Animatronics, “a kind of primitive 
robotics” that produced “consistently convincing illusions to help support the 
larger cinematic fantasy” (pp. 121-122).  Disney embraced technologies including 
sound, color, television, and computer-generated imagery as well as distribution 
technologies such as the DVD and the Internet (Bryman, 1997; Telotte, 2008).
Sound and color.  Hollywood studios began experimenting with sound 
in the 1920s (Barlow, 2005) and color in the 1930s (Telotte, 2008).
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Warner Bros. initiated the “talkies” era with The Jazz Singer in 1927 
(Barlow, 2005).  At Disney, Bryman (1997) noted, “The Jazz Singer convinced 
Walt that the future of cartoons lay in sound” (p. 424).  Disney included sound in 
cartoons such as Steamboat Willie in 1928 to stand out from rival animators 
(Bryman, 1997; Telotte, 2008).  “Steamboat Willie,” Bryman (1997) wrote, 
“radically altered the public’s perception of cartoon films and gave a huge boost 
to the industry as well as to the Disney studio” (p. 428).  For Fantasia in 1940, 
Disney created Fantasound, a pioneering, but expensive stereo surround-sound 
system that was installed in only two theaters, in New York and Los Angeles 
(Telotte, 2008).
As for color, Disney adopted Technicolor’s three-strip process in 1932 in 
exchange for an exclusive two-year deal.  Flowers and Trees, Disney’s first 
Technicolor project, was released the same year.  The technology was adopted 
later in the decade by other studios with Technicolor films such as A Star is Born, 
Gone With the Wind, and The Wizard of Oz (Telotte, 2008).  After the 
development of sound and color, the basic technology behind moviemaking was 
mostly unchanged until the introduction of digital effects in the 1980s (Hozic, 
1999).
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Television.  Television brought programming into homes beginning in 
the 1940s and 1950s (Barlow, 2005).  Hollywood initially responded to the 
medium with alarm, Aksoy and Robins (1992) wrote: “Television appeared to 
have created a totally new entertainment product capable of displacing 
Hollywood movies” (p. 2).  As Scott (2004) noted, “In the immediate post-war 
decades, the two industries became locked into an intense competitive battle as 
more and more consumers turned to television as their preferred form of 
distraction, with consequent severe drops in attendance at motion-picture 
theaters” (p. 183).  According to Barlow (2005), “Studios scrambled for 
alternative technologies and gimmicks that would keep people in theater seats 
and away from their couches” (p. 3), including 3-D and widescreen formats such 
as Panavision and CinemaScope.  “The film industry,” Telotte (2008) noted, 
“generally saw television not so much as a sign of progress, as one more possible 
enhancement to or outlet for its work, but as a future competitor, even a potential 
replacement” (p. 97).
“By the end of the 1950s,” Scott (2004) wrote, “these lines of separation 
and antagonism were becoming increasingly blurred” (p. 183) and studios began 
establishing their own television production divisions.  Initially, studios kept 
their best films away from the small screen.  In the 1960s and 1970s, broadcasts 
of Hollywood movies became more common, Barlow (2005) noted, but usually in 
edited, “pan-and-scan forms that are anathema to cinema purists” (p.8).  In 1960, 
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40 percent of network prime-time programming was produced in Southern 
California; four decades later, that had increased to 90 percent (Scott, 2004). 
Disney began producing television programming in 1950 with a one-hour 
Christmas special for NBC (Telotte, 2008).  In 1954, Disney agreed to produce 
the weekly Disneyland television series for ABC in a deal that created an outlet 
for Disney content, allowed the studio to promote its movie projects, and 
guaranteed millions of dollars in financing for the Disneyland theme park.  In 
1961, Disney moved its weekly show to NBC so it could produce programming in 
color.  In 1983, the Disney Channel cable network was founded.  Disney also has 
joined with other media giants to establish or buy cable channels such as Lifetime 
and A&E (Telotte, 2008).
Disney acquired ABC in 1995 for $19 billion, then the second-largest 
corporate takeover ever, in part to benefit from deregulation in 1991 ending 
financial interest and syndication rules that prohibited networks from owning a 
financial stake in their programming (Fabrikant, 1995; Scott, 2004; Telotte, 
2008).  These “fin-syn” rules were established by the Federal Communications 
Commission in the early 1970s, Bielby and Bielby (2003) noted, and were 
intended “to promote diversity and competition in the supply of prime-time 
entertainment programming and to forestall the kind of vertical integration that 
dominated the film industry during the studio era” (p. 574).  Robert Iger, then 
president of ABC, and other television network executives argued that dropping 
the fin-syn rules would increase the diversity of programming while helping 
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networks compete with new technologies.  By 2002, however, ABC, CBS, Fox, 
and NBC had full or partial ownership of 77.5% of their first-season prime-time 
programs (Bielby & Bielby, 2003).
Special and digital effects.  In the 1970s, moviemakers such as George 
Lucas and Steven Spielberg turned to special effects technology to assert control 
over their productions, Hozic (1999) noted: “The principal elements of Lucas and 
Spielberg’s strategy have been lower production costs, replacement of stars with 
technology and special effects, and control over merchandising and licensing 
rights” (p. 294).  Disney turned to special effects to revive its struggling movie 
studio—developing a computer-controlled camera effects system in the late 1970s 
to allow realistic effects for The Black Hole, then integrating animation and 
computer graphics in the early 1980s for Tron (Telotte, 2008).
In the 1990s, Disney teamed up with Pixar to pioneer computer-generated 
imagery.  Pixar’s filmmakers, Telotte (2008) wrote, created in movies such as Toy 
Story “a CGI world that is a caricatured yet near-realistic environment” 
(p. 162).  In part, Pixar films have been successful, Telotte (2008) wrote, “because 
they have managed to balance off the real and the wondrous, primarily through 
an approach implicit in that rhetoric of the ‘better than real’ ” (p. 165).
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Home entertainment: film, videotape, DVD, and the Internet.  
Until after World War II, audiences viewed most movies in theaters.  However, 
limited home viewing began in the 1920s with the 16 mm Kodascope projector, 
then, in the 1930s, with Kodak’s less expensive 8 mm format (Barlow, 2005).  
However, Barlow (2005) noted, home movie collecting was viewed as “an oddity, 
a vehicle for hobbyists” (p. 2) until the introduction of videotape.
In the 1970s, electronics manufacturers began marketing videocassette 
recorders that played movies on VHS tape or the ultimately unsuccessful 
Betamax format (Barlow, 2005).  Once again, Hollywood initially viewed a new 
technology as a threat.  Disney and Universal Studios unsuccessfully sued Sony, 
owner of the Betamax format, Barlow (2005) wrote, “claiming that the record 
button on the Betamax abetted in copyright infringement” (p. 145).  In the 1980s, 
however, studio executives realized they could profit from the sale and rental of 
VHS movies.  By the mid-1990s, watching movies on VHS tape and, to a lesser 
extent, laserdisc was common (Barlow, 2005).  Before videotape, Barlow (2005) 
noted, only a few films—such as Casablanca, Gone With the Wind, and The 
Wizard of Oz—“had a broad and lasting cultural impact” (p. 44).  “Since the 
introduction of the VCR, however, films both new and old have been shouldering 
their way into the general consciousness” (p. 45), among them George Lucas’ 
original Star Wars trilogy.
The Digital Video Disc, originally called the Digital Versatile Disc, but now 
commonly known as the DVD, was introduced in 1997; by 2001, DVDs had 
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mostly replaced videotape and laserdiscs (Barlow, 2005).  The DVD brought a 
cultural shift, Barlow (2005) wrote, making “it possible to watch a movie at home 
confident you are seeing an authoritative version” (p. xii).  DVDs offer better 
picture quality than videotape and have room for features including 
commentaries from writers, directors, and actors; deleted scenes; “making of” 
documentaries; and revised versions of a movie, such as the director’s cut of 
Brazil or the “alternate beginning” of The Adventures of Buckaroo Banzai Across 
the Eighth Dimension (Barlow, 2005).
For the major studios, the theater box office is now just the beginning of 
the revenue stream.  In addition to home video distribution, studios or their 
corporate parents have interests in cable and satellite systems and channels 
(Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Hozic, 1999).  Widescreen high-definition television and 
surround-sound systems provide a movie experience comparable to the theater, 
and home viewing accounts for three-quarters of the film industry’s global 
revenues (Barlow, 2005).
Disney has developed an online presence through its Walt Disney Internet 
Group, providing content on websites such as ABC.com and ESPN.com and using 
the Internet to market its theme parks and other ventures (Telotte, 2008).  
Disney also has recognized the potential of online distribution of movies and 
other programming.  “We are confident,” then-CEO Michael Eisner told 
Wetlaufer (2000), “that the confluence of the computer and the television is 
coming.  We are confident that our customers will get their movies and 
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entertainment and news and information from the Internet” (p. 123).  Within 
weeks of replacing Eisner as CEO in 2005, Robert Iger decided that Disney would 
be the first broadcaster to make its shows available through Apple’s iTunes store 
for the iPod (Walt Disney Co., n.d., c).  In 2010, Disney began to provide content 
on Apple’s new iPad, releasing an “app” for viewing ABC shows on the tablet 
computer (Chmielewski, 2010; Disney/ABC Television Group, 2010).
Technology as ‘a natural part’ of our world.  Throughout its history, 
Telotte (2008) noted, Disney has emphasized technology both as an element of 
its operations and in the work it produces for a global audience:
Technology has to be made to fit into our world, to seem a natural part of 
it rather than a challenge or intrusion.  In some instances a rhetoric had to 
be developed for talking about the technology and what it could offer, as 
we see in Disney’s treatment of space technology in its television shows of 
the 1950s, or in the way Pixar carefully drew out an aesthetic for digital 
animation in the 1990s. (p. 180)
Apple, Silicon Valley, and the Entertainment Industry
The growth of the Internet and the convergence of innovation in the 
semiconductor, computer hardware, software, and telecommunications 
industries expanded the use of information and communications technologies 
(ICTs), Ayres and Williams (2004) noted, resulting in a “rapid transition towards 
a digital economy” (p. 315).  The entertainment industry’s “fortunes are entwined 
with ICTs,” Ayres and Williams (2004) wrote.  “Indeed, the application of ICTs to 
innovating entertainment products is an important driver for the continued 
growth of the industry” (p. 315).
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In particular, digital technology allows for online distribution of music and 
video, Ayres and Williams (2004) wrote, which “could significantly stimulate 
demand but also raises the thorny question of how to protect intellectual property  
rights of content providers” (p. 315).  These content owners, Gillespie (2006) 
wrote, “wish to constrain what people do with their work—play but not copy, 
transport but not distribute—but they also wish to publish it, make it widely 
available and, typically, secure some cash in return” (p. 652).
Even before the Internet, Silicon Valley companies found customers in 
Hollywood.  One of the valley’s oldest technology companies, Hewlett-Packard, 
has a long relationship with Disney.  In 1937, Disney purchased HP’s first 
product, an audio oscillator used in recording sound for Fantasia (Telotte, 
2008).  In 2003, HP struck a 10-year alliance to provide computers and printers 
for Disney’s corporate operations; HP also operates a 1,000-computer “rendering  
farm” used by Disney and DreamWorks animators (Telotte, 2008).
Silicon Valley has been a hub of much of the innovation that led to the 
digital economy.  In the late 1950s, the integrated circuit was developed in part by  
Robert Noyce of Fairchild Semiconductor (Ayres & Williams, 2004).  Under 
Moore’s Law, coined by Fairchild’s Gordon Moore, the capacity of integrated 
circuits would double about every two years.  Noyce and Moore left Fairchild in 
1968 to establish Intel, which invented the computer microprocessor in 1971 
(Ayres & Williams, 2004).  In 1976, Apple marketed its first desktop computer, 
which included an Intel microprocessor.  Apple introduced its mass-produced 
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Apple II computer in 1977 (Ayres & Williams, 2004; Sumner, 2007).  In 1980, 
IBM entered the personal computer market, licensing an operating system from 
Microsoft—then a small software startup—and creating a new industry standard.  
Apple introduced the Macintosh in 1984, positioning it as an alternative to the 
IBM PC (Ayres & Williams, 2004; Boyd-Barrett, 2006; Sumner, 2007; West, 
2005).  “The Mac was immediately recognized,” West (2005) noted, “as 
incorporating breakthrough technology, most notably being the first with a 
graphical user interface for mass market PC buyers” (p. 5).  Apple’s sales grew in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, but the company rapidly lost ground to PCs running 
Microsoft’s Windows 95 operating system, which was hailed as easier to use than 
earlier versions of Windows (West, 2005).
With the decline of the aerospace and military sector in the 1990s, 
technology companies such as Silicon Graphics turned to Hollywood for projects 
and funding (Hozic, 1999).  As military spending dropped after the Cold War, the 
Clinton administration and California officials encouraged the conversion of 
military technologies to civilian use, particularly by the entertainment industry, 
Hozic (1999) noted: “The true relevance of Hollywood’s obsession with 
technology becomes more obvious if we look beyond Star Wars and Star Trek to 
the broader context of political and economic change in the United States and the 
global economy” (p. 298).
27
Multi-sided markets and technology monopolies.  As developers of 
computer operating systems, Microsoft and Apple operate in what economists 
call two-sided or multi-sided markets.  Both companies rely on consumers and 
software developers for their marketplace success; Microsoft also relies on 
computer hardware makers.  Many companies in the media, technology, and 
Internet sectors operate in such markets (Rysman, 2009).  “Two-sided markets,” 
Rysman (2009) noted, “typically have network effects and as such are likely to tip 
toward a single dominant platform.  As a result, it is not surprising that these 
markets are of interest to antitrust authorities” (p. 137).
One such antitrust case involved Microsoft and the market for Web 
browsers.  The U.S. Defense Department network that led to the Internet was 
created in the 1970s; two decades later, Silicon Valley entrepreneur Jim Clark 
was among the first to recognize its mass market potential.  Clark and Marc 
Andreessen established Netscape Communications in Silicon Valley to 
commercialize the Mosaic browser Andreessen developed at the University of 
Illinois (Ayres & Williams, 2004).  Perceiving the Netscape browser as a threat to 
its computer operating system, Microsoft responded by bundling the Internet 
Explorer browser with Windows 95.  Microsoft’s action resulted in an antitrust 
lawsuit by the U.S. Justice Department in 1997.  However, as that case worked its 
way through the courts, Netscape lost share in the browser market and was 
acquired by AOL in 1999 (Ayres & Williams, 2004).
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The Internet and digital distribution of entertainment content.  
As the Internet grew in the 1990s, specialized search engines were developed by 
Silicon Valley companies such as Yahoo and later Google.  The Internet relies on 
computer servers designed by companies such as Hewlett-Packard and Sun 
Microsystems (now part of Oracle)—and routers and other networking 
equipment marketed by Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks.  Technology 
companies have relied on consumer demand for entertainment industry content 
such as music and movies for much of the Internet’s growth (Ayres & Williams, 
2004).  The entertainment industry guards intellectual property rights to its 
content, but some in the technology sector have a different perspective on 
copyright law, Ayres and Williams (2004) noted: “The view among technology 
buffs in Silicon Valley seems to be that copyrights are obsolete because 
‘information wants to be free’ ” (p. 332).
Apple introduced the iPod in 2001, but it wasn’t a success with consumers 
until 2003, when Apple launched the iTunes music store (Johnson, Christensen, 
& Kagermann, 2008; Lohr, 2010).  “Apple’s true innovation,” Johnson, 
Christensen, and Kagermann (2008) wrote, “was to make downloading music 
easy and convenient.  To do that, the company introduced a groundbreaking 
business model that combined hardware, software, and service” (p. 52).  The 
combination of iPod and iTunes, Shelton (2009) wrote, “disrupted the music 
industry by giving consumers what they wanted—their own choice of music, 
competitively priced, and available ‘anytime, anywhere’ electronically from 
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purchase to play” (p. 41).  Indeed, iTunes sells nearly 3 million downloaded songs 
a day, an 83 percent share of the digital music market (Sundie, Gelb, & Bush, 
2008).  Despite its higher cost compared with competing devices, Apple’s iPod is 
now the dominant digital music player, not necessarily because of “structural 
constraints” in the market, Sundie, Gelb, and Bush (2008) wrote, “but rather 
because consumers don’t perceive the available substitutes as substitutes” 
(p. 178).  Building on the iPod’s success, Apple introduced the iPhone in 2007.  
The iPhone incorporated a music player into a cellphone, Goggin (2009) noted, 
but also moved the mobile phone “much more into the realm of other online 
media” (p. 243) by including an Internet browser and, eventually, access to third-
party software applications, or apps, through Apple’s iTunes store.
Movies and other video programming are now distributed online through 
services such as Apple’s iTunes, which has offered sales of television shows and 
music videos since 2005, and movie rentals since 2008; Silicon Valley-based 
Netflix; and Hulu, which was established as a joint venture of ABC, NBC, Fox and 
other entertainment companies (Bilton, 2009; Markoff, 2008; Markoff & Holson, 
2005).  The combination of online distribution and information technology also 
can connect viewers to movies and other programming of interest.  Netflix and 
TiVo in Silicon Valley and Amazon.com in Seattle, Davenport and Harris (2009) 
noted, “are primarily distributors of cultural products” that use “collaborative 
filtering” recommendation software as “an adjunct to their main business 
model” (p. 25).  Netflix’s software, for example, “produces movie 
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recommendations by correlating a data set of more than a billion movie ratings 
from its customers” (p. 25).
Intellectual property and anti-piracy technology.  “Piracy remains 
a major obstacle” to online distribution of media content, Ayres and Williams 
(2004) noted, “a problem that will only grow worse as network connections 
improve to allow download of high-quality video” (pp. 336-337).  Entertainment 
and technology companies share a common interest in protecting intellectual 
property (Ayres & Williams, 2004; Barlow, 2005).  “Entertainment and software 
firms,” Ayres and Williams (2004) noted, “have been cautious in offering 
products in forms that could be more easily copied” (p. 337).  “A corporation like 
Microsoft or Disney,” Barlow (2005) wrote, “sees a future where it loses control 
over its most valued assets—for Microsoft, its software codes, for Disney, its 
animated creations and its movies” (p. 147).  Corporate interests, including media 
and technology companies, vigilantly guard control of their intellectual property.  
However, Lessig (2004) contended, copyright and patent protections are 
intended for the good of society rather than for the benefit of individual 
innovators or content creators.  “Intellectual property is an instrument,” he 
wrote.  “It sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains 
subservient to the value of creativity” (p. 19).
Media companies such as Disney have lobbied Congress to extend the 
amount of time granted for copyright protections.  For example, Lessig (2004) 
noted, Disney contributed an estimated $800,000 to lawmakers during the 1998 
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election cycle as Congress considered the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act, which lengthened copyright terms by 20 years.  The Motion Picture 
Association of America and the Recording Industry Association of America also 
contributed to the lobbying effort for the bill.  The U.S. Constitution, Lessig 
noted, gives Congress limited authority over intellectual property rights; 
copyright law allows for fair use and the eventual movement of content into the 
public domain.  Disney’s copyright on Mickey Mouse, for example, expires in 
2023 (Bagdikian, 2004).  At that time, Barlow (2005) noted, Disney’s star 
character “will be available for anyone to use, in any way they may wish to”
(p. 147) under current copyright law.
Before the introduction of digital technology, Gillespie (2006) wrote, 
“copyright law and the mechanisms of enforcement were the primary means” 
(p. 652) of regulating the use of creative content.  In recent years, studios have 
turned to anti-piracy technology such as Content Scrambling System (CSS) 
encryption (Barlow, 2005; Gillespie, 2006) to prevent digital reproduction of 
DVDs.  “This digital rights management (DRM) strategy,” Gillespie (2006) noted, 
“if it works, offers benefits over enforcement through law” (p. 65)—preempting 
copyright infringement before it takes place and avoiding use of the legal system 
to pursue damages.  “No anti-piracy system will be infallible,” Ayres and Williams 
(2004) wrote.  “The point is to make copying difficult enough to discourage most 
cases” (p. 337).
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The 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act made it unlawful to 
circumvent anti-piracy technology.  Lessig (2004) described the legislation as 
“legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was intended to 
support the legal code of copyright” (p. 157, emphasis in the original).  While the 
DMCA protects technology that prevents copyright infringement, it also can block 
the fair use of content (Barlow, 2005; Gillespie, 2006).  As Barlow (2005) noted, 
“A right that cannot be exercised is no right at all” (p. 148).  Media companies, 
Barlow (2005) wrote, should “find ways of coming to terms with consumer 
manipulation of copyrighted material” (p. 156); however, they “perceive such 
manipulation as attacks on the basis of their very existences—so they will fight 
hard to protect themselves” (p. 156).
Google, Facebook, the Internet, and the Disruption of Media
Internet search engines such as Google and social media companies such 
as Facebook have transformed a mass media landscape once dominated by 
publishers and broadcasters.  In particular, the Internet has disrupted the 
business models of established media companies.  In the news industry, for 
example, six in 10 U.S. consumers now get some of their news online on a typical 
day (Rainie & Purcell, 2010).  According to Purcell, Rainie, Mitchell, Rosenstiel, 
and Olmstead (2010), the Internet has surpassed radio and newspapers “and 
ranks just behind TV” (p. 3) in popularity as a news platform.
Using algorithms to search for the latest news, Internet portals such as 
Google News have automated the traditional “gatekeeping” function of editors 
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employed by established news organizations (Bui, 2010).  Social media sites such 
as Facebook and Twitter, Hermida (2010) wrote, allow individuals and 
organizations to take their messages directly to audiences, “enabling the 
disintermediation of news and undermining the gatekeeping functions of 
journalists” (p. 300).  The asynchronous, many-to-many communication 
potential of the Internet and social media has transformed the dissemination of 
political messages.  In Egypt, young protesters used Facebook and other social 
media sites in 2011 to organize demonstrations that led to the overthrow of 
dictator Hosni Mubarak (Hassan & Fleishman, 2011).  In the United States, the 
leaderless Occupy Wall Street movement has used Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube to spread its message (Preston, 2011).  However, the Internet can be 
used to distribute misinformation. For example, blogs and email were used to 
spread the false rumor during the 2008 presidential campaign that then-Sen. 
Barack Obama was a Muslim (Kenski, Hardy, & Hall Jamieson, 2010; Weeks & 
Southwell, 2010). 
With the growth of social media, Purcell et al. (2010) noted, news 
consumers have a more participatory relationship with media content;  “37% of 
internet users,” they wrote, “have contributed to the creation of news, 
commented about it, or disseminated it via postings on social media sites like 
Facebook or Twitter” (p. 2).  Increasingly, news consumers are using social 
networking sites to connect directly with content creators.  “In other words,” 
Purcell et al. (2010) wrote, “they have friended or become a fan of a journalist or 
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news organization and they catch up on news through this relatively new channel 
of news dissemination” (pp. 40-41).
While publishers and broadcasters are struggling to support their 
businesses in this media environment, innovators such as Google and Facebook 
have created successful advertising-supported Internet business models.  Social 
media sites such as Facebook, Rainie and Purcell (2010) wrote, have become 
proficient at targeting advertising to viewers by encouraging or requiring them to 
provide demographic data before viewing content on their platforms.
At the same time, search engines such as Google have brought more 
efficiency to the process of gathering the news.  Machill and Beiler (2009) noted 
that journalists use Google to check facts and find information relevant to their 
stories without the constraints of time or space; however, they may not 
necessarily be aware that Google delivers results selected from the perspective of 
its search engine algorithms.  “Search engine bias,” though, can work to the 
benefit of established journalists and news organizations, Bui (2010) noted: 
When it comes to the news media environment, such bias means that a 
limited number of big media are more likely to be included and ranked in 
high order by search engines.  The more links a website has and the more 
prestigious those links are, the higher it is in ranking order.  Consequently, 
in theory, there is little chance for local, newly-formed or lesser-known 
media to compete with mainstream media. (p. 6)
News Coverage of Entertainment and Technology Companies
Disney owns the ABC television network, which in turn owns broadcast 
news outlets such as KABC-TV in Los Angeles and KGO-TV in San Francisco 
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(ABC, n.d.).  Other major television news outlets serving Los Angeles and Silicon 
Valley are controlled by corporate giants such as NBC Universal, which owns 
KNBC in Los Angeles and KNTV in San Jose, and News Corp., which owns the 
Fox Television Stations, including KTTV in Los Angeles (NBC Universal, n.d.; 
News Corp., n.d.).
Corporate-owned news media, Bagdikian (2004) contended, “present the 
public with unnecessarily incomplete news because, with rare exceptions, they 
take their news from governmental and private power centers” (p. 85).  
Furthermore, Bagdikian (2004) wrote, mass media are reluctant to report what 
they “know with exquisite detail: important information about the major media 
themselves” (p. 102).  Countering this view, Fortunato (2005) noted that 
journalists’ professional standards call for straightforward reporting, even when 
their corporate employers are involved in the news (Fortunato, 2005).  For 
example, in an interview with Fortunato (2005), ABC News President David 
Westin “indicated that people from Disney do not call him about editorial 
content” (p. 100).  However, Bagdikian (2004) argued, corporate owners needn’t 
interfere directly with news operations because they can hire and fire senior 
decision makers.
Fortunato (2005) noted “the cross-promotional opportunities” available to 
corporate media giants: “For example, Disney can use ABC to promote its Disney 
films and theme parks and use its theme parks to promote its films, musical 
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artists, and ABC programming” (p. 109).  Often, however, news media outlets 
also promote competitors’ products (Fortunato, 2005).
The biggest newspapers in Southern California and the San Francisco Bay 
Area are controlled by large corporate chains such as the Tribune Co., owner of 
the Los Angeles Times; Hearst, which owns the San Francisco Chronicle; and 
MediaNews Group, majority owner of the San Jose Mercury News and Los 
Angeles Daily News (Hearst, n.d.; MediaNews Group, n.d.; Tribune, n.d.).  These 
publishers aren’t owned by the Big Five media conglomerates.  However, 
Bagdikian (2004) contended, “newspapers’ relatively detailed stories are still 
clustered around the center-right of politics because their news is mainly drawn 
from corporate life and major political leaders” (p. 121).  Like many technology 
and media companies, newspapers operate in two-sided markets, Rysman (2009) 
noted, depending on both readers and advertisers for financial success.
Journalistic and corporate values.  News media, Johnson-Cartee 
(2005) wrote, “are inherently part of the community where they exist” (p. 187) 
and select stories “that will have an impact on the audience.  Stories are selected 
that will ‘touch’ or affect the audience in some way; in other words, the stories 
will ‘connect’ with audience members, establishing resonance” (p. 127).
Large corporations may have advantages in framing media messages—
stemming in part from how journalists do their work.  “Every metropolitan 
newspaper in the country has a daily section specializing in business and 
corporate affairs,” Bagdikian (2004) wrote.  “But for decades they devoted most 
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of their space and energies to the celebration of corporate executives as heroes 
and geniuses” rather than “investigating and publishing sins of 
corporations” (p. 103).  Indeed, Gans (1979) identified “responsible capitalism” as 
one of the values of U.S. journalism:
The underlying posture of the news toward the economy resembles that 
taken toward the polity: an optimistic faith that, in the good society, 
businessmen and women will compete with each other in order to create 
increased prosperity for all, but that they will refrain from unreasonable 
profits and gross exploitation of workers or customers.  While monopoly is 
clearly evil, there is little explicit or implicit criticism of the oligopolistic 
nature of much of today’s economy. (p. 41)
Journalists seek balance in their stories in part by allowing individuals, 
corporations or other entities to respond to criticism (Johnson-Cartee, 2005).  As 
journalists seek multiple sources, Fortunato (2005) wrote, they “are inevitably 
presented with and asked to sift through multiple frames” (p. 60).  In the process 
of creating public messages, Johnson-Cartee (2005) noted, “experienced ‘frame-
makers,’ or those with skills in crafting and sponsoring policy frames, are more 
likely to have their frames accepted than those who are novices” (p. 25).
Johnson-Cartee (2005) identified news promoters as “those individuals or 
groups who draw attention to occurrences, naming and identifying these 
occurrences as significant for others” (p. 183).  They “construct information that 
promotes their preferred version of reality; in other words, they construct 
narrative frames” (p. 199).  Corporations and other entities, Fortunato (2005) 
wrote, “try to get the mass media to select their stories and frame those stories 
from their perspective.  Why these content providers try to frame an issue is not 
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difficult to discern: They are trying to influence the public, policy, sales, voting, or 
whatever other behavior might be their desired outcome” (pp. 58-59).  
Furthermore, Johnson-Cartee (2005) wrote, “news promoters will frame 
attributes associated with the people, organizations, issues, policies, or positions 
in negative or positive terms.  Such characterizations influence how others will 
evaluate the subjects” (p. 200).  Corporate reputations, Dowling and Weeks 
(2008) wrote, can be measured “by listening to how people and journalists talk 
about a company and examining the specific words and phrases they use to 
describe and evaluate it” (p. 29).
Corporations, public relations, and technology coverage.  
Content providers, Fortunato (2005) noted, are often represented by “public 
relations professionals who have skill and training in crafting messages, carefully 
selecting their distribution vehicle, and developing relationships with the mass 
media” (p. 136).  Apple and most other major corporations, Dowling and Weeks 
(2008) wrote, have in-house public relations groups “tasked with creating a 
positive image for their company” (p. 31).  “These public relations professionals,” 
Fortunato (2005) wrote, “are entrusted with presenting the person or group they 
represent in the most positive light to the mass media and audience” (p. 136).  
Journalists and public relations professionals have different roles in this process:
The public relations professionals’ objective is in providing honest facts, 
but their interpretation of facts and events and what they choose to 
highlight or frame are highly subjective and in their own interests.  The 
journalist must understand that he or she is merely obtaining only one 
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perspective when speaking to a public relations practitioner. (Fortunato, 
2005, p. 137.)
Indeed, media messages have contributed to the adoption of personal 
computers, Kelly (2009) noted.  Both news articles and advertisements have 
increased consumer desire for personal computers since they were introduced in 
the marketplace in the 1980s, Kelly wrote, with framing intended to affirm 
“middle-class aspirations for career success by assuming that enhanced 
competitiveness in school and the workplace was a desirable goal and ultimately 
create consumer demand for a new, high-end durable good” (p. 37).  For the 
computer and other new technologies, messages from mass media and other 
sources, Vishwanath (2009) wrote, “not only help create initial impressions 
about the innovation, but also construct meaning, which once formed, potentially  
endures, affecting all further interactions with the technology” (p. 178).
Many journalists who cover the technology industries focus on new 
products, their chances for success in the marketplace and how they affect 
company sales and profitability (Dowling & Weeks, 2008).  In mainstream media 
coverage, positive themes, such as technology’s ability to empower its users, 
outweigh negative themes, such as technology’s “destructive effect on our 
attention spans” (Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, 
2010, p. 2).  Despite the influence of public relations practitioners, journalists 
choose their own “mental models” of corporate news, Dowling and Weeks (2008) 
wrote: “For example, a technology company that we studied promoted the 
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functionally oriented, innovative features of its product, but journalists focused 
on the product’s styling” (p. 32).  News media also influence consumers’ 
perceptions of individual companies, Dowling and Weeks (2008) noted:
The power of the media comes from its reach and prominence, its role in 
certifying some companies as legitimate and important players in the 
market and people’s beliefs that it has superior access to information and 
expertise in evaluating companies.  In this way, what the media says has a 
real impact on the business fortunes of companies. (p. 28)
The Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism (2010) 
found, based on a content analysis of U.S. news outlets from June 1, 2009, to 
June 30, 2010, that nearly one-quarter of stories involving technology conveyed 
“the notion that technology is making life easier and more productive” (p. 1).  The 
study included national and local newspapers, cable and network newscasts, 
websites, and radio programs.  In technology coverage by such mainstream news 
outlets, the Pew researchers concluded, “the press reflects exuberance about 
gadgets and a wonder about the corporations behind them, but wariness about 
effects on our lives, our behavior and the sociology of the digital age” (p. 3).
The Pew study found the launch of Apple’s newest iPhones was the 
second-biggest storyline during the period surveyed, followed closely by the 
introduction of Apple’s iPad tablet computer.  Apple, “with its flashy press events 
and often drawn out releases of new products” (Pew Research Center’s Project for  
Excellence in Journalism, 2010, p. 2), accounted for 15.1% of technology stories, 
more than any other company.  Apple was followed by two other Silicon Valley 
technology companies, Google and Facebook.  Social media startup Twitter, 
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based in San Francisco, was fourth.  “Once feared” Microsoft, the study found, 
“fell far behind—attracting just a fifth of the coverage of Apple and less than half 
that of Twitter” (p. 2).  Overall, coverage of technology companies such as Apple 
was “generally positive” (p. 3):
For Apple, the most heavily covered technology company, 42% of the 
stories described the company as innovative and superior, and another 
27% lauded its loyal fan base.  But there were doubts.  The most common 
such negative thread, that Apple products don’t live up to the hype, 
appeared in 17% of stories about Apple.  For Google, the company’s 
advancements in making content easier to find topped its coverage at 25%.  
But it was only half as likely as Apple to be framed as having superior, 
innovative products (20%). (Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence 
in Journalism, 2010, p. 3)
While Apple has a favorable image in the press, it also has a reputation as 
a company that seeks to tightly control news coverage of its newest products, Carr  
(2010) wrote: “Apple executives have often behaved as though the ultimate 
custody and control of information lies with them, and the company has gone to 
extraordinary lengths to protect its interests.”  Apple’s overwhelmingly positive 
reputation in the news media has persisted, Carr noted, despite the company’s 
limited interaction with reporters:
The media’s crush on Apple has always been an unrequited love affair.  
The company has a few familiars in the press whom it favors, but Apple 
has “no comment” programmed on a macro key.  The company has 
unsuccessfully sued bloggers who, it believed, had punctured its veil of 
secrecy, and important tech news organizations like Wired have been shut 
out as a result of coverage deemed ill-mannered. (Carr, 2010)
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Summary and Theory
Silicon Valley and Hollywood.  Disney, Apple, Google, and Facebook 
operate in two of the best-known regional industrial agglomerations: Southern 
California’s Hollywood entertainment industry cluster and Northern California’s 
Silicon Valley technology industry cluster.  These two regional industrial 
agglomerations share close ties, with Hollywood emerging as Southern 
California’s dominant employer after the decline of the aerospace and military 
sector—and with entertainment studios replacing that industry as major 
customers for Silicon Valley technology companies.  In both industries, major 
corporations operate with monopolistic or oligopolistic market power.  Disney 
and Apple, meanwhile, were closely linked by the presence of Apple CEO Steve 
Jobs as a Disney board member and the company’s largest individual 
shareholder.
Entertainment companies such as Disney and technology companies such 
as Apple, Google, and Facebook are sources of creativity and innovation.  
Hollywood and Silicon Valley are economic and cultural forces globally and in the 
regions where they are located, and Silicon Valley has helped Hollywood expand 
its cultural reach with new technologies such as Internet distribution of content.  
Entertainment and technology companies also attempt to influence public policy
—particularly anti-piracy and copyright legislation. 
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Analytical framework.  Silicon Valley technology companies and 
Hollywood entertainment companies are subjects of news coverage because of 
their economic and cultural impact, both regionally and globally; their products; 
and their efforts to influence public policy.
Media and technology corporations, like other news promoters or content 
providers, frame messages in an effort to influence news coverage in the regions 
where they are based and elsewhere.  Corporations, particularly those in the 
media and technology industries, may have several advantages in this process.  
News organizations, Johnson-Cartee (2005) observed, are influenced by the 
communities in which they exist.  Journalists’ values, Gans (1979) and Bagdikian 
(2004) noted, favor corporate interests.  Most large media conglomerates own 
broadcast news organizations (Bagdikian, 2004), and the technology industries 
have a long history of interaction with the entertainment industry.  Journalists, 
Johnson-Cartee (2005) wrote, seek balance by sifting through competing frames, 
and experienced frame-makers are usually more successful in this process.  
Corporations such as Apple, Google, Facebook, and Disney employ public 
relations practitioners who are knowledgeable about framing and targeting 
messages (Dowling & Weeks, 2008; Fortunato, 2005), although journalists 
construct their own models of corporate news.
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Research.  This environment for news coverage of Silicon Valley 
technology companies and Hollywood entertainment companies raises numerous 
possible questions for research.  This study involved an analysis of quantitative 
data to determine whether the presence of a regional industrial agglomeration 
such Silicon Valley’s technology cluster or Hollywood’s entertainment industry is 
reflected in news coverage of Apple, Google, Facebook, Disney, and other large 
technology or entertainment companies by newspapers in Northern California, 
Southern California, and elsewhere in the country.
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Research Questions
The economic, geographical, and cultural relationships between Apple, 
Google, Facebook, Disney, other technology and media companies, news 
organizations, and regional news audiences raise many possible research 
questions.  In this study, three questions were considered:
Q1. Is the presence of a technology or entertainment business 
cluster reflected in the volume of business news coverage of 
companies in these industries by the largest daily newspapers in 
Silicon Valley and Los Angeles?  Does the technology sector dominate 
business news coverage in the San Jose Mercury News?  Does the motion picture 
industry dominate business news coverage in the Los Angeles Times?  How does 
that coverage compare with business news in the Chicago Tribune, the largest 
newspaper in a city with multiple corporate headquarters, but without a major 
regional industrial agglomeration?
Q2. Is the relationship between the technology and 
entertainment industries reflected in business news coverage?  Does 
the San Jose Mercury News provide a substantial volume of coverage of the 
entertainment industry?  Does the Los Angeles Times provide a substantial 
volume of coverage of the technology sector?
Q3. Is the global economic and cultural impact of the technology 
and entertainment industries reflected in business news coverage 
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regardless of location?  Is there a substantial volume of coverage of the 
technology and entertainment industries in all three newspapers?
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Method
The study involved a quantitative analysis of samples of company 
references during a 12-month period in the largest general-interest daily 
newspapers in San Jose, Los Angeles, and Chicago.  The analysis included 
business news coverage in three regional newspapers: the San Jose Mercury 
News in Silicon Valley; the Los Angeles Times in Southern California; and the 
Chicago Tribune, chosen because it is published in a city that is a major business 
center, but where no industry is a dominant employment sector.  For further 
analysis, the references were grouped by industry sectors and locations of 
company headquarters.
Hypotheses
The samples were analyzed to test support for three hypotheses:
H1. The literature suggests that business clusters are powerful economic 
forces in their regions, that journalists’ values favor corporate interests, and that 
news organizations reflect the communities they serve.  Therefore, the presence 
of regional industrial agglomerations in Silicon Valley or Los Angeles will result 
in a large volume of coverage of technology companies such as Apple, Google, 
and Facebook in the San Jose Mercury News and entertainment companies such 
as Disney in the Los Angeles Times.
H2. The literature suggests a strong economic and geographical 
relationship between the Silicon Valley technology business cluster and the 
Hollywood entertainment cluster.  Therefore, this relationship will result in a 
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large volume of coverage of the entertainment industry by the San Jose Mercury 
News and of the technology industries by the Los Angeles Times.
H3. The literature suggests that Silicon Valley’s technology cluster and 
Hollywood’s entertainment industry are global economic and cultural forces that 
affect news readers no matter where they live.  Therefore, all three newspapers 
will include a substantial volume of coverage of technology and entertainment 
companies.
Story Samples
Samples of staff stories were prepared by selecting articles from the three 
newspapers during a 12-month period from April 2010 to March 2011.  News 
articles and commentaries were downloaded from the ProQuest Newsstand 
database and the internal archives of the San Jose Mercury News.  Stories 
published on the 5th, 15th, and 25th of each month were selected for the samples.  
Stories were identified as involving financial news if the name of a private 
company, industry or economic topic was included in the headline.  (For 
example, articles published in the San Jose Mercury News on June 15, 2010, 
with key headline words such as “Yahoo,” “tech firms,” “Microsoft,” “home sales,”  
and “ratepayer funds” were identified as eligible for the Mercury News sample.)
Excluded from the story samples were articles without bylines, opinion 
and editorial page articles, consumer advocacy columns, entertainment and arts 
reviews and profiles, celebrity news columns, and political stories—some of which 
involved former eBay CEO Meg Whitman, who was running for governor of 
49
California during the 12-month period, and former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly 
Fiorina, who was seeking a U.S. Senate seat from California.
The archive searches produced numerous stories that were duplicates 
from other editions of the same newspaper.  In these cases, only the most 
complete version of a story was included.
Newspaper industry consolidation influenced the definition of “staff 
story.”  The San Jose Mercury News is owned by the Bay Area News Group, 
which is controlled by parent company MediaNews Group.  Articles with a 
Mercury News or Bay Area News Group tag or email address in the byline were 
considered staff stories.  The Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune are 
owned by the Tribune Co., which shares resources such as a Washington bureau 
and columnists among its newspapers.  During the 12-month time period, neither 
newspaper distinguished between stories prepared by company staff in Los 
Angeles, Chicago or elsewhere; these stories were presented with only the names 
of the reporter (or reporters) in the byline.  No effort was made in this study to 
determine whether an article presented as a staff story in the Los Angeles Times 
was actually written by a Tribune Co. employee in the Chicago Tribune 
newsroom or elsewhere, and vice versa.  Stories distributed by the McClatchy-
Tribune News Service also were presented in the same way as staff stories in the 
Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune.  Such stories were excluded from the 
Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune samples if the reporter was recognized 
as a San Jose Mercury News employee.  No effort was made to identify writers 
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for other newspapers distributed by the McClatchy-Tribune News Service; 
however, it is believed that very few such stories were included in the Los Angeles 
Times and Chicago Tribune samples.  Articles with bylines that included 
references to news services such as The Associated Press, Reuters, or Bloomberg 
News were not considered staff stories.
It should be noted that the researcher has been employed by the Mercury 
News and wrote some of the bylined stories included in the San Jose sample.
Company References
After the story samples were prepared, the researcher counted references 
to private-sector companies or businesses.  A “company reference” was defined as 
at least one mention of a company in a story.  For example, if Apple was 
mentioned in a story 10 times, and Microsoft was mentioned once, one company 
reference was noted for both Apple and Microsoft.
Research and analyst firms that provided information for a story but were 
not the subject of a story (such as DataQuick, Jeffries and Co., etc.) were excluded 
from the count of company references.
An effort was made to eliminate duplicate company references to a 
subsidiary and its parent company.  If a story was primarily about a parent 
company, but noted the subsidiaries owned by that parent company, a company 
reference was counted for the parent company, but not the subsidiaries.  If a story  
was primarily about a subsidiary, but noted that the subsidiary was owned by the 
parent company, a company reference was counted only for the subsidiary.  For 
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example, if a story about Walt Disney Co.’s earnings noted the media company’s 
ownership of ABC and The Disney Channel, a company reference was counted 
only for Walt Disney Co.  In isolated instances, company references were noted 
for both a parent company and subsidiary or for more than one subsidiary when 
each business establishment was a subject of the story (for example, in the case of 
a recent acquisition of one company by another).
Numerous relatively small companies were mentioned in only one story in 
one of the three newspapers.  These one-time company references were 
considered not relevant for the purpose of this study.  An initial data set was 
prepared that included references to 307 companies that were mentioned at least 
twice among the three newspapers.  For example, a company that was mentioned 
once in the Mercury News and once in the Los Angeles Times was included in the 
data set, as were companies that were mentioned at least twice in one of the three 
newspapers.  An analysis of variance, or ANOVA, test conducted for this data set 
found significant differences within the group and between groups for company 
references in the Mercury News sample (F = 29.469, p < 0.001).  However, this 
initial data set did not otherwise meet the standard of statistical significance 
(F = .809, p = .751 for the Chicago Tribune sample; F = .537, p = .970 for the Los 
Angeles Times sample), perhaps because of numerous one-time references to 
subsidiaries of media and other parent companies.
A second data set (Table 1) was prepared that grouped subsidiaries with 
their corporate parents, resulting in 241 companies or company groupings.  For 
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example, references to YouTube were grouped with its parent company, Google.  
An ANOVA test of this data set found statistically significant (p ≤ 0.001) 
differences between and within groups for all three newspaper samples (Mercury 
News, n = 503, F = 76.632, p < 0.001; Chicago Tribune, n = 476, F = 53.118,
p < 0.001; Los Angeles Times, n = 634, F = 29.433, p = 0.001; n signifies the 
number of company references in each newspaper sample).
Table 1.
Company References Grouped by Parent Company
Parent Company          
or Company
San Jose 
Mercury News*
Chicago 
Tribune*
Los Angeles 
Times**
Total
 n = 
503
%   n = 
476
% n = 
634
% n = 
1,613
% 
Google (YouTube)
Apple
Facebook
Microsoft
Twitter
Walt Disney Co. (Disney 
Channel, Disney Interactive 
Studios, Disneyland, ABC, 
Disney/Pixar Animation 
Studios, Walt Disney 
Studios)
Hewlett-Packard
News Corp. (Fox 
Interactive, Fox Kids, Fox 
Business Network, Fox 
Searchlight, 20th Century 
Fox, Fox, Fox News 
Channel, MySpace, Wall 
Street Journal)
Time Warner (New Line 
Cinema, Warner Bros. 
Interactive Entertainment, 
Cartoon Network, CNN, 
HBO, Time Inc., Warner 
Bros.)
43 8.5% 17 3.6% 22 3.5% 82 5.1%
45 8.9% 12 2.5% 23 3.6% 80 5.0%
27 5.4% 13 2.7% 15 2.4% 55 3.4%
26 5.2% 7 1.5% 11 1.7% 44 2.7%
19 3.8% 5 1.1% 12 1.9% 36 2.2%
2 0.4% 5 1.1% 24 3.8% 31 1.9%
24 4.8% 1 0.2% 4 0.6% 29 1.8%
4 0.8% 5 1.1% 20 3.2% 29 1.8%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 24 3.8% 28 1.7%
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Parent Company          
or Company
San Jose 
Mercury News*
Chicago 
Tribune*
Los Angeles 
Times**
Total
 n = 
503
%   n = 
476
% n = 
634
% n = 
1,613
% 
Viacom (CMT, 
Nickelodeon, Comedy 
Central, Spike TV, MTV 
Networks, Paramount 
Pictures)
Amazon.com (Internet 
Movie Database)
Sony (Sony Pictures)
NBC Universal (MSNBC, 
Universal Pictures, 
Universal Studios 
Hollywood, NBC)
Toyota Motor (Lexus)
Yahoo
eBay (PayPal)
Intel
Bank of America 
(Countrywide Financial, 
Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch)
Netflix
Wal-Mart Stores
General Motors (Cadillac, 
Chevrolet)
UAL (Continental Airlines, 
United Airlines)
Cisco Systems
Verizon Communications 
(Verizon Wireless)
JPMorgan Chase
AT&T
Oracle (Sun Microsystems)
Groupon
BP
Pacific Gas & Electric/
PG&E
Target
CBS (CBS Entertainment, 
Showtime)
Ford Motor
McDonald's
Wells Fargo
Goldman Sachs
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 24 3.8% 27 1.7%
6 1.2% 12 2.5% 7 1.1% 25 1.5%
3 0.6% 8 1.7% 14 2.2% 25 1.5%
1 0.2% 5 1.1% 19 3.0% 25 1.5%
1 0.2% 9 1.9% 14 2.2% 24 1.5%
16 3.2% 2 0.4% 3 0.5% 21 1.3%
13 2.6% 4 0.8% 4 0.6% 21 1.3%
12 2.4% 1 0.2% 7 1.1% 20 1.2%
2 0.4% 7 1.5% 11 1.7% 20 1.2%
8 1.6% 5 1.1% 6 0.9% 19 1.2%
4 0.8% 9 1.9% 6 0.9% 19 1.2%
1 0.2% 9 1.9% 8 1.3% 18 1.1%
0 0.0% 16 3.4% 2 0.3% 18 1.1%
16 3.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 17 1.1%
11 2.2% 0 0.0% 6 0.9% 17 1.1%
0 0.0% 7 1.5% 10 1.6% 17 1.1%
7 1.4% 3 0.6% 6 0.9% 16 1.0%
12 2.4% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 15 0.9%
5 1.0% 8 1.7% 2 0.3% 15 0.9%
1 0.2% 5 1.1% 9 1.4% 15 0.9%
13 2.6% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 14 0.9%
2 0.4% 4 0.8% 8 1.3% 14 0.9%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 8 1.3% 12 0.7%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 8 1.3% 12 0.7%
1 0.2% 6 1.3% 4 0.6% 11 0.7%
1 0.2% 5 1.1% 5 0.8% 11 0.7%
1 0.2% 4 0.8% 6 0.9% 11 0.7%
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Table 1. Continued
Parent Company          
or Company
San Jose 
Mercury News*
Chicago 
Tribune*
Los Angeles 
Times**
Total
 n = 
503
%   n = 
476
% n = 
634
% n = 
1,613
% 
Sears Holdings (Kmart, 
Sears)
Samsung Electronics
AOL (TechCrunch)
HTC
Gawker Media (Gawker, 
Gizmodo)
AMR/American Airlines
Honda Motor
Boeing
Motorola/Motorola Mobility
Adobe Systems
Best Buy
Sara Lee
Citigroup (Citibank)
Fannie Mae
IBM
Zynga
LinkedIn
Electronic Arts
Procter & Gamble
Comcast
Walgreen
Barnes & Noble
Freddie Mac
Dell
Research In Motion
Starbucks
Nintendo
Safeway (Vons/Pavilions, 
Dominick’s)
Nissan Motor
Foursquare
Delta Air Lines
J.C. Penney
BMW
Craigslist
Coinstar (Redbox)
Advanced Micro Devices
Acer
THQ
0 0.0% 7 1.5% 4 0.6% 11 0.7%
5 1.0% 3 0.6% 2 0.3% 10 0.6%
4 0.8% 2 0.4% 4 0.6% 10 0.6%
5 1.0% 1 0.2% 3 0.5% 9 0.6%
4 0.8% 0 0.0% 5 0.8% 9 0.6%
0 0.0% 8 1.7% 1 0.2% 9 0.6%
0 0.0% 5 1.1% 4 0.6% 9 0.6%
0 0.0% 5 1.1% 4 0.6% 9 0.6%
5 1.0% 2 0.4% 1 0.2% 8 0.5%
5 1.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 8 0.5%
2 0.4% 4 0.8% 2 0.3% 8 0.5%
0 0.0% 5 1.1% 3 0.5% 8 0.5%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 4 0.6% 8 0.5%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 6 0.9% 8 0.5%
5 1.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 7 0.4%
5 1.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 7 0.4%
5 1.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 7 0.4%
3 0.6% 0 0.0% 4 0.6% 7 0.4%
2 0.4% 4 0.8% 1 0.2% 7 0.4%
2 0.4% 2 0.4% 3 0.5% 7 0.4%
1 0.2% 5 1.1% 1 0.2% 7 0.4%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 6 0.9% 7 0.4%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 6 0.9% 7 0.4%
4 0.8% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 6 0.4%
4 0.8% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 6 0.4%
3 0.6% 2 0.4% 1 0.2% 6 0.4%
3 0.6% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 6 0.4%
2 0.4% 1 0.2% 3 0.5% 6 0.4%
1 0.2% 3 0.6% 2 0.3% 6 0.4%
1 0.2% 2 0.4% 3 0.5% 6 0.4%
0 0.0% 5 1.1% 1 0.2% 6 0.4%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 2 0.3% 6 0.4%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 3 0.5% 6 0.4%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 3 0.5% 6 0.4%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 4 0.6% 6 0.4%
4 0.8% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 5 0.3%
3 0.6% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 5 0.3%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 4 0.6% 5 0.3%
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Table 1. Continued
Parent Company          
or Company
San Jose 
Mercury News*
Chicago 
Tribune*
Los Angeles 
Times**
Total
 n = 
503
%   n = 
476
% n = 
634
% n = 
1,613
% 
Southwest Airlines
T. Rowe Price Group
Kraft Foods
Hyatt Hotels
Kohl's
Macy's
Allstate
Pandora
Skype
SAP
Palm
Kleiner Perkins Caufield & 
Byers
Y Combinator
Sprint Nextel/Sprint
Chevron
New York Times
Edison International/
Southern California Edison
Salesforce.com
General Electric
Virgin America
Morgan Stanley
Sempra Energy (Southern 
California Gas, San Diego 
Gas & Electric)
State Farm
Health Care Service (Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of 
Illinois)
Vanguard Group
EADS (Airbus)
Tribune Co. (Los Angeles 
Times)
UnitedHealth Group
(PacifiCare)
Toys R Us
Activision Blizzard
Ally Financial (GMAC 
Mortgage)
Volkswagen
Costco Wholesale
0 0.0% 5 1.1% 0 0.0% 5 0.3%
0 0.0% 5 1.1% 0 0.0% 5 0.3%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 1 0.2% 5 0.3%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 1 0.2% 5 0.3%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 2 0.3% 5 0.3%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 3 0.5% 5 0.3%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 4 0.6% 5 0.3%
4 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 0.2%
4 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 0.2%
3 0.6% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 4 0.2%
3 0.6% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
3 0.6% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
3 0.6% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
2 0.4% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
2 0.4% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
2 0.4% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 4 0.2%
1 0.2% 2 0.4% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 4 0.2%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 4 0.2%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 4 0.2%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 4 0.2%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 0 0.0% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 4 0.8% 0 0.0% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 1 0.2% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 2 0.3% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 2 0.3% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 2 0.3% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 3 0.5% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 3 0.5% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 3 0.5% 4 0.2%
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Table 1. Continued
Parent Company          
or Company
San Jose 
Mercury News*
Chicago 
Tribune*
Los Angeles 
Times**
Total
 n = 
503
%   n = 
476
% n = 
634
% n = 
1,613
% 
DreamWorks Animation 
SKG
Miramax
VMware
U.S. Venture Partners
Silver Lake Partners
Zillow
Digital Sky Technologies/
DST
Nvidia
BrightSource Energy
Tesla Motors
Intuit
Nordstrom
Borders Group
Wendy's Arby's Group/
Wendy’s
Yum Brands (KFC, Taco 
Bell)
Gap
US Airways
Charles Schwab Corp.
CVS Caremark (CVS 
Pharmacy)
Daimler/Mercedes-Benz
Johnson & Johnson
Whole Foods Market
Lennar
Northrop Grumman
Vizio
Chrysler
Home Depot
Blockbuster
American Express
New York Stock Exchange/
NYSE Euronext
William Morris Endeavor
Summit Entertainment
Living Social
Liberty Media (Starz 
Media)
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 0.6% 4 0.2%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 0.6% 4 0.2%
3 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
3 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
3 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
2 0.4% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
2 0.4% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 3 0.6% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 1 0.2% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 3 0.2%
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Table 1. Continued
Parent Company          
or Company
San Jose 
Mercury News*
Chicago 
Tribune*
Los Angeles 
Times**
Total
 n = 
503
%   n = 
476
% n = 
634
% n = 
1,613
% 
Wellpoint/Anthem Blue 
Cross
Weinstein Co.
Legendary Pictures
Lionsgate
Blue Shield of California
Better Place
3Par
Cypress Semiconductor
Toshiba
Juniper Networks
Fry’s Electronics
Blekko
Greylock Partners
Sequoia Capital
Demand Media
Castlight Health
Andreessen Horowitz
VantagePoint Venture 
Partners
General Mills
Nokia
McAfee
New Enterprise Associates
Avaya
CareerBuilder
Monster
In-N-Out Burger
Pfizer
Solaria
Infineon Technologies
Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia
Ubisoft Entertainment
Hulu
Exelon/Commonwealth 
Edison
Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics/Philips
Midwest Banc Holdings/
Midwest Bank
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 3 0.2%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 3 0.2%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
2 0.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
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Parent Company          
or Company
San Jose 
Mercury News*
Chicago 
Tribune*
Los Angeles 
Times**
Total
 n = 
503
%   n = 
476
% n = 
634
% n = 
1,613
% 
Supervalu (Jewel-Osco)
Taylor Capital Group/Cole 
Taylor Bank
Campbell Soup
Coca Cola
Forever 21
Abbott Laboratories
Volvo
Priceline
JetBlue Airways
Playboy Enterprises
Experian
Bank of Montreal
Northern Trust
FirstMerit
Yelp
Winston & Strawn
Equifax
Trans Union
Apollo Group
Burger King
TSX Group/Toronto Stock 
Exchange
JBS
Baxter International
Teva Pharmaceutical 
Industries
Unilever
Rolls-Royce Group
Logitech International
Panasonic
Berkshire Hathaway
Mazda Motor
Drugstore.com
Aeropostale
American Eagle Outfitters
Zumiez
Saks
Qantas Airways
Deutsche Bank
US Bancorp
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
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Parent Company          
or Company
San Jose 
Mercury News*
Chicago 
Tribune*
Los Angeles 
Times**
Total
 n = 
503
%   n = 
476
% n = 
634
% n = 
1,613
% 
Deutsche Boerse
DoubleLine Capital
London Stock Exchange
Norwest Venture Partners
Pimco
Aetna
Westfield Group
Starline Tours
Brinker International 
(Chili’s, Maggiano’s Little 
Italy)
Exxon Mobil
Occidental Petroleum
Irvine Co.
Lawry's the Prime Rib
American Apparel
Sanofi-Aventis
SunPower
Hasbro
Subaru
Yucaipa Cos.
Tiffany
Bungie Studios
Relativity Media
Bloomberg
East West Bancorp
AIG
Barclays
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.1%
Notes: *p < 0.001; **p = 0.001
Groupings for Further Analysis
Company references were further grouped by three factors: location, 
defined as the U.S. metropolitan statistical area or country of the company’s 
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Table 1. Continued
headquarters; industry, defined by three- or four-digit NAICS code; and a 
broader researcher-designated industry sector.
The NAICS, or North American Industry Classification System, was 
developed by the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican governments to allow detailed 
comparison of business, employment, and related economic statistics.  
Employment establishments are designated by two- to six-digit codes allowing 
for various levels of detail and comparison.  For example, a printed circuit 
assembly manufacturer is designated by the six-digit 334418 code; the five-digit 
33441 code and four-digit 3344 code for semiconductor and other electronic 
component manufacturing; the three-digit 334 code for computer and electronic 
product manufacturing; and the two-digit 33 code, which is one of three such 
two-digit codes for manufacturers in general (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
n.d., a; U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.).
In this study, companies were grouped primarily by three-digit NAICS 
codes, such as 512 for the motion picture and sound recording industries.  
However, for this study, it was necessary to distinguish between technology and 
media companies with an NAICS code of 511 for publishers.  For that reason, 
these companies were grouped by the four-digit 5111 code for newspaper, 
periodical, book, and directory publishers; and the four-digit 5112 code for 
software publishers. 
The federal government does not disclose NAICS codes reported by 
individual companies (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d., a).  However, NAICS 
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codes can be obtained from private databases.  For this study, ProQuest 
Newsstand, Standard & Poor’s NetAdvantage, and Gales Databases’ Business & 
Company Resource Center were sources of NAICS codes.  Companies may have 
multiple NAICS codes for various business establishments.  In cases of 
companies with more than one NAICS code, a “primary NAICS code” was 
determined.  For example, Apple’s primary three-digit NAICS code is 334 for 
computer and electronics product manufacturing, the company’s largest source of 
revenue.  However, Apple also operates smaller businesses with NAICS codes 
such as 5112 for software publishing.  Standard & Poor’s NetAdvantage was the 
main source of primary NAICS codes.  NAICS codes could not be determined 
from these sources for 15 companies.  In these cases, the researcher assigned an 
NAICS code based on similar companies.
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provides extensive employment-
related data grouping establishments by NAICS code.  The bureau reports 
employment by percentage of the total workforce.  It also calculates a “location 
quotient,” or LQ, for each industry defined as the ratio of “analysis industry” 
employment to “base industry” or all employment in a region divided by the ratio 
of analysis industry to base industry employment in a comparison area.  For this 
study, the comparison area was the nation as a whole.  The bureau’s location 
quotient calculator (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d., b) was used to 
determine the LQ for each industry in the three metropolitan statistical areas 
where the Mercury News, the Los Angeles Times, and the Chicago Tribune are 
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published.  For example, an LQ of 13.12 was found in 2010 for NAICS code 334, 
computer and electronics product manufacturing, in the San Jose-Sunnyvale-
Santa Clara, CA MSA, and an LQ of 7.82 was found for NAICS code 512, motion 
picture and sound recording industries, in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa 
Ana, CA MSA.  By comparison, an LQ of 1 would indicate that an industry’s 
proportion of employment in a region is the same as in the nation as a whole.  In 
this study, employment data sets for 2010 were used.  The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data can be incomplete.  For example, when it would be possible to infer 
proprietary information such as the size of an individual company’s workforce, 
the bureau reports employment by percentage and the LQ for an individual 
NAICS code as “N.D.” for “non-disclosable.”
Finally, companies were grouped into broader researcher-designated 
sectors, primarily based on NAICS codes.  For example, the technology sector 
included NAICS codes 334 (computer and electronics manufacturing), 5112 
(software publishers), 517 (telecommunications), and 518 (Internet service 
providers, Web search portals, and data processing services).  The media sector 
included NAICS codes 5111 (newspaper, book, periodical, and database 
publishers), 512 (motion picture and sound recording industries), and 515 
(broadcasting).  In a few cases, companies were assigned individually to broader 
sectors.  For example, Twitter and Bloomberg are both assigned to the NAICS 
code 519 for information services.  However, for this study, Twitter was 
designated as a technology company and Bloomberg as a media company.
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Results
The samples were analyzed by company references; groupings of 
references to companies and parent companies; industries, as determined by 
NAICS codes; and researcher-designated industry sectors, which often included 
multiple NAICS codes.
Company References
Apple, Google, and Facebook were the three largest sources of company 
references in the Mercury News sample (Table 2.1), the Los Angeles Times 
sample (Table 2.2) and the Chicago Tribune sample (Table 2.3).  This was 
consistent with Hypothesis 1 for the Mercury News sample, contrary to 
Hypothesis 1 but partly consistent with Hypothesis 2 for the Los Angeles Times 
sample, and partly consistent with Hypothesis 3 for the Chicago Tribune sample.  
However, the relevance of this data set to any of the hypotheses is ambiguous, 
primarily because of the lack of statistical significance for the Los Angeles Times 
and Chicago Tribune samples.
Even so, it may be worth noting that the 10 largest sources of company 
references in the Mercury News sample included nine technology companies.  
Based on the Pew study and other literature, it was not surprising to find Apple, 
Google, and Facebook at the top of this list.  Four of the technology companies—
Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Twitter, and Yahoo—compete with Apple, Google, or  
Facebook.  The other two technology companies were Intel, the largest supplier of 
computer microprocessors, and Cisco Systems, the largest maker of Internet 
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networking equipment.  The only non-technology company was Pacific Gas & 
Electric, a utility that serves customers in Northern California.  PG&E was the 
subject of numerous news stories related to the September 2010 explosion of a 
natural gas pipeline in San Bruno on the San Francisco Peninsula, an accident 
that killed eight people and destroyed dozens of homes.
Table 2.1
San Jose Mercury News Company References
Company References 
n = 503
%
Apple
Google
Facebook
Microsoft
Hewlett-Packard
Twitter
Yahoo
Cisco Systems
Pacific Gas & Electric/PG&E
Intel
45 8.9%
43 8.5%
27 5.4%
26 5.2%
24 4.8%
19 3.8%
16 3.2%
16 3.2%
13 2.6%
12 2.4%
Apple, Google, and Facebook also led a list of the 10 largest sources of 
company references in the Los Angeles Times sample.  One entertainment 
industry employer, Warner Bros., was among these 10 companies.  (Grouping 
entertainment subsidiaries with parent companies, however, produced a 
substantially different result.)  Two technology companies, Twitter and Microsoft,  
and two large financial companies, Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase, also 
were on this list.  Also included was Toyota Motor, which was the subject of 
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numerous news stories related to manufacturing problems, recalls, and the safety  
of its vehicles.  In addition, the list included BP, which was the subject of 
numerous news stories related to its role in a major oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  
This sample, however, did not meet the standard of statistical significance.  The 
Los Angeles Times sample of company references grouped by parent company, 
on the other hand, produced statistically significant results that were relevant to 
this study.
Table 2.2
Los Angeles Times Company References
Company References 
n = 634
%
Apple
Google
Facebook
Toyota Motor
Warner Bros.
Twitter
Microsoft
Bank of America
JPMorgan Chase
BP
23 3.6%
19 3.0%
15 2.4%
14 2.2%
13 2.1%
12 1.9%
11 1.7%
10 1.6%
10 1.6%
9 1.4%
Apple, Google, and Facebook also were the three largest sources of 
company references in the  Chicago Tribune sample, although the order was 
different.  Facebook led the list of 10 businesses that were the largest sources of 
company references in the Chicago Tribune sample, followed by Apple and 
Google.  Three other technology-related companies were included: Amazon.com, 
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Groupon (a Chicago-based startup), and Microsoft.  The list also included two 
airlines, United Airlines and American Airlines; Wal-Mart Stores; and Toyota.  
Relevant conclusions related to the three hypotheses cannot be drawn from this 
sample, however, because it did not meet the standard of statistical significance.
Table 2.3
Chicago Tribune Company References
Company References 
n = 476
%
Facebook
Apple
Google
Amazon.com
Wal-Mart Stores
United Airlines
Toyota Motor
Groupon
American Airlines
Microsoft
13 2.7%
12 2.5%
11 2.3%
11 2.3%
9 1.9%
9 1.9%
8 1.7%
8 1.7%
8 1.7%
7 1.5%
Company References Grouped by Parent Company
Grouping business subsidiaries by parent companies produced slightly 
different results for the Mercury News sample (Table 3.1), substantially different 
results for the Los Angeles Times sample (Table 3.2), and somewhat different 
results for the Chicago Tribune sample (Table 3.3).  As noted above, an ANOVA 
test also produced statistically significant (p ≤ 0.001) differences between and 
within groups for all three newspaper samples.
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Statistically significant correlations were found between the newspaper 
samples.  Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the strongest correlation (55.9%, p < .001) 
was found between the Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune samples.  It is 
possible that this could be partly the result of shared resources by two 
newspapers owned by the Tribune Co.  Partly consistent with Hypothesis 2, there 
was a slightly stronger correlation between the Mercury News and Los Angeles 
Times samples (46.8%, p < .001) than between the Mercury News and Chicago 
Tribune samples (43.3%, p < .001).
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, technology companies were the largest 
source of company references grouped by parent company in the Mercury News 
sample.  As with the ungrouped sample, Apple, Google, and Facebook were the 
three largest sources of company references; nine technology companies were 
among the 10 largest sources of company references; and PG&E was the only 
non-technology company among the 10.  Internet commerce company eBay, 
grouped with its online-payment subsidiary PayPal, replaced semiconductor 
maker Intel on this list.
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Table 3.1
San Jose Mercury News Company References Grouped by Parent Company
Parent Company or Company References 
n = 503
%
Apple
Google (YouTube)
Facebook
Microsoft
Hewlett-Packard
Twitter
Yahoo
Cisco Systems
eBay (PayPal)
Pacific Gas & Electric/PG&E
45 8.9%
43 8.5%
27 5.4%
26 5.2%
24 4.8%
19 3.8%
16 3.2%
16 3.2%
13 2.6%
13 2.6%
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, three Big Five media conglomerates with 
operations in Southern California’s entertainment industry—Disney, Time 
Warner, and Viacom—were the largest sources of company references grouped by  
parent company in the Los Angeles Times sample.  A list of the 10 largest sources 
of company references grouped by parent company also included News Corp., 
owner of 20th Century Fox and other Fox media properties; NBC Universal; and 
Sony, owner of Sony Pictures.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Apple, Google, and 
Facebook also were on this list—but no longer in the three leading positions.  
Toyota was the only non-media or non-technology business that was among the 
10 largest sources of company references grouped by parent company in the Los 
Angeles Times sample.
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Table 3.2
Los Angeles Times Company References Grouped by Parent Company
Parent Company or Company References 
n = 634
%
Walt Disney Co. (Disney Channel, Disney Interactive Studios, Disneyland, 
ABC, Disney/Pixar Animation Studios, Walt Disney Studios)
Time Warner (New Line Cinema, Warner Bros. Interactive Entertainment, 
Cartoon Network, CNN, HBO, Time Inc., Warner Bros.)
Viacom (CMT, Nickelodeon, Comedy Central, Spike TV, MTV Networks, 
Paramount Pictures)
Apple
Google (YouTube)
News Corp. (Fox Interactive, Fox Kids, Fox Business Network, Fox 
Searchlight, 20th Century Fox, Fox, Fox News Channel, MySpace, Wall 
Street Journal)
NBC Universal (MSNBC, Universal Pictures, Universal Studios Hollywood, 
NBC)
Facebook
Sony (Sony Pictures)
Toyota Motor (Lexus)
24 3.8%
24 3.8%
24 3.8%
23 3.6%
22 3.5%
20 3.2%
19 3.0%
15 2.4%
14 2.2%
14 2.2%
Partly consistent with Hypothesis 3, six technology-related companies 
were among the 11 largest sources of company references grouped by parent 
company in the Chicago Tribune sample.  (A three-way tie for ninth place 
required a list of 11 companies rather than 10.)  Google, grouped with its video-
sharing social media site YouTube, was the largest source of company references.  
By contrast, social networking site Facebook was the largest source of company 
references in the ungrouped sample, but dropped to the third-largest source on 
this list.  Apple and Amazon.com were tied as the fourth-largest source.  Sony, as 
much a consumer electronics maker as a media company, and Groupon, a 
technology-related startup with headquarters in Chicago, also were represented.  
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Five non-technology or non-media companies were included: two airline 
companies with hubs in Chicago, UAL and American Airlines; two automakers, 
General Motors and Toyota; and Wal-Mart Stores.
Table 3.3
Chicago Tribune Company References Grouped by Parent Company
Parent Company or Company References 
n = 476
%
Google (YouTube)
UAL (Continental Airlines, United Airlines)
Facebook
Apple
Amazon.com (Internet Movie Database)
Toyota Motor (Lexus)
Wal-Mart Stores
General Motors (Cadillac, Chevrolet)
Sony (Sony Pictures)
Groupon
AMR/American Airlines
17 3.6%
16 3.4%
13 2.7%
12 2.5%
12 2.5%
9 1.9%
9 1.9%
9 1.9%
8 1.7%
8 1.7%
8 1.7%
Headquarters Location
There were too few cases to conduct an ANOVA test on the samples of 
company references grouped by headquarters location.  Paired-sample T-tests 
showed the differences between company samples did not meet the standard of 
statistical significance (p = .900 for the Mercury News-Chicago Tribune pairing, 
p= .545 for the Mercury News-Los Angeles Times pairing, and p = .270 for the 
Los Angeles Times-Chicago Tribune pairing).  However, one-sample T-tests 
found statistical significance in the Chicago Tribune sample (p < .001) and the 
Los Angeles Times sample (p = .003).  The Mercury News sample (p = .056) was 
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just outside the 95% confidence level (p ≤ 0.05) that is standard for research in 
the social sciences, but above the 90% confidence level (p ≤ 0.1) that allows for 
consideration of data with the understanding that additional studies would be 
needed to confirm any conclusions drawn from the sample.  (The test value for all 
one-sample T-tests in this study was designated as 0, under the assumption that 
only a very small fraction of the population of private-sector employment 
establishments, locations, or industries would be included in such a newspaper 
sample.  In other words, although the mean number of company references for 
private-sector employment establishments by location or other factors would be 
impossible to determine, it would be approximately 0.)
Statistically significant correlations (p < 0.001) were found between each 
of the newspaper samples.  The strongest correlation (73.1%) was found between 
the Los Angeles Times (Table 4.2) and Chicago Tribune (Table 4.3) samples, 
contrary to Hypothesis 2 that the strongest geographical link between companies 
and news coverage would be between Silicon Valley and Southern California.  It is 
possible that this correlation could be partly the result of shared news resources 
by two newspapers owned by the Tribune Co.  Partly consistent with Hypothesis 
2, the correlation between the Mercury News sample (Table 4.1) and the Los 
Angeles Times sample (58.5%) was slightly stronger than the correlation between 
the Mercury News and Chicago Tribune samples (56.5%).
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Table 4.1
San Jose Mercury News Company References Grouped by Location
Metro area or country of 
company headquarters
References 
n = 503
%
San Jose
San Francisco
New York
Seattle
Chicago
Japan
Los Angeles
Taiwan
Dallas
Minneapolis
South Korea
242 48.1%
87 17.3%
38 7.6%
38 7.6%
13 2.6%
10 2.0%
9 1.8%
8 1.6%
7 1.4%
5 1.0%
5 1.0%
Table 4.2
Los Angeles Times Company References Grouped by Location
Metro area or country of 
company headquarters
References 
n = 634
%
New York
San Jose
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Japan
Seattle
Chicago
Detroit
Dallas
England
Washington, D.C.
167 26.3%
97 15.3%
68 10.7%
41 6.5%
40 6.3%
31 4.9%
29 4.6%
21 3.3%
15 2.4%
14 2.2%
14 2.2%
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Table 4.3
Chicago Tribune Company References Grouped by Location
Metro area or country of 
company headquarters
References 
n = 476
%
Chicago
San Jose
New York
San Francisco
Seattle
Japan
Dallas
Los Angeles
Detroit
Minneapolis
88 18.5%
59 12.4%
59 12.4%
28 5.9%
28 5.9%
28 5.9%
21 4.4%
16 3.4%
15 3.2%
14 2.9%
For both the Mercury News and Chicago Tribune samples, the largest 
number of references grouped by location were of companies with headquarters 
in the metropolitan area where the newspaper is published.  However, for the Los 
Angeles Times, the largest number of references grouped by location were of 
companies with headquarters in the New York area.  Even so, results for all three 
newspaper samples offered support for Hypothesis 1.  In the Mercury News 
sample, 48.1% of company references were from the San Jose metropolitan area, 
and the next-largest source of company references was the adjacent San 
Francisco-Oakland-Fremont metropolitan area (17.3%).  This is consistent with 
the suggestion in Hypothesis 1 that business news coverage in the Mercury News 
would be dominated by Silicon Valley’s technology industries.  Although New 
York was the largest source of company references (26.3%) in the Los Angeles 
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Times, with Los Angeles third (10.7%), that was also consistent with Hypothesis 1  
that the newspaper would include substantial coverage of the Hollywood business 
cluster.  Three of the largest media conglomerates with entertainment industry 
operations in Southern California—News Corp., Time Warner, and Viacom—have 
corporate headquarters in New York, although Disney has headquarters in 
Burbank, a city in the Los Angeles metro area.  Company references in the 
Chicago Tribune, meanwhile, may have been less influenced by headquarters 
location.  The Chicago metro area was the largest source of company references at  
18.5%, followed by San Jose and New York. 
San Jose was the second-largest source of company references in both the 
Los Angeles Times (15.3%) and the Chicago Tribune (12.4%, tied with New York), 
partly consistent with the assertion in Hypothesis 2 of a strong link between Los 
Angeles and Silicon Valley’s technology industries and partly consistent with the 
suggestion in Hypothesis 3 of a strong connection between the technology 
industries and news organizations and readers regardless of location.  However, 
contrary to Hypothesis 2, Los Angeles was the seventh-largest (1.8%) source of 
company references in the Mercury News, and the Seattle metro area—the 
location of technology companies Microsoft and Amazon.com—was as large a 
source of company references (7.6%) for the newspaper as New York, where three 
of the Big Five media companies have their headquarters.
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Industries by NAICS Code
There were too few cases to conduct an ANOVA test on the samples of 
company references grouped by primary NAICS code.  Paired-sample T-tests 
showed the differences between company samples did not meet the standard of 
statistical significance (p = .428 for the Mercury News-Los Angeles Times 
pairing; p = .872 for the Mercury News-Chicago Tribune pairing; and p = .127 
for the Los Angeles Times-Chicago Tribune pairing).  However, one-sample T-
tests found that the individual newspaper samples were statistically significant 
(p = .011 for the Mercury News sample and p < .001 for the Los Angeles Times 
and Chicago Tribune samples).
Moderate to strong statistically significant correlations were found 
between the newspaper samples.  The strongest correlation (66.6%, p < .001) was 
found between the Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune samples, contrary to 
the suggestion in Hypothesis 2 that the strongest link would be between the two 
regions in California.  It is possible that this correlation could be partly the result 
of shared news resources within the Tribune Co.  The next-strongest correlation 
(53.1%, p < .001) was found between the Mercury News and Los Angeles Times 
samples.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the weakest correlation (46.6%, p = .001) 
was found between the Mercury News and Chicago Tribune samples.
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed evidence of strong 
employment agglomerations in Silicon Valley in technology-related industries 
such as computer and electronics manufacturing (NAICS code 334), information 
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services (519), and software publishers (5112)—and, to a lesser extent, Internet 
service providers, Web search portals, and data processing services (518).  These 
four industries were among the five largest sources of company references in the 
Mercury News sample (Table 5.1).  Computer and electronics manufacturing, 
with an LQ of 13.12 and more than 13 percent of total employment in the San 
Jose MSA, accounted for more than 30% of company references in the Mercury 
News sample.  Telecommunications (517) was the fourth-largest source of 
company references in the sample.  However, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
reported employment data for that sector and others in the San Jose metro area 
as “non-disclosable.”  A one-sample T-test found that the San Jose sample of 
company references grouped by industry—condensed to exclude industries with 
non-disclosable employment data—was statistically significant (p = .041).  A 
relatively strong 67.1% correlation (p < .001) was found between company 
references grouped by industry and the San Jose metro area location quotient for 
each industry in the sample.  A slightly weaker 62.2% correlation (p <  .001) was 
found between company references grouped by industry and industries’ 
percentages of total employment in the San Jose metro area.  Notably, the 
correlation between the number of company references grouped by industry and 
both employment factors was stronger than the 52.8% correlation (p = .002) 
between the two employment factors.
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Table 5.1
San Jose Mercury News Company References
Grouped by Primary NAICS Code
Primary NAICS code References 
n = 503
% of 
references
San Jose % of 
employment
San Jose 
LQ
334 Computer and electronics 
manufacturing
518 Internet service providers, Web 
search portals, and data processing 
services
5112 Software publishers
517 Telecommunications
519 Information services
523 Securities, commodities contracts, 
and other financial investments and 
related activities
221 Utilities
454 Non-store retailers
532 Rental and leasing services
452 General merchandise stores
155 30.82% 13.56% 13.12
91 18.09% 0.61% 2.68
62 12.33% 1.49% 6.1
49 9.74% N.D. N.D.
27 5.37% 2.19% 16.44
19 3.78% 0.42% 0.56
18 3.58% N.D. N.D.
17 3.38% N.D. N.D.
8 1.59% 0.28% 0.59
6 1.19% 1.82% 0.65
Employment data for the Los Angeles metro area were available from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for every industry in the Los Angeles Times sample 
(Table 5.2).  The employment data showed evidence of a strong regional business 
cluster in the motion picture and sound recording industries (NAICS code 512).  
With an LQ of 7.82, this industry sector accounted for more than 13 percent of 
company references in the Los Angeles Times sample and about 2.7% of the 
employment in the Los Angeles MSA.  The apparel manufacturing industry, 
which was not among the 10 largest sources of company references (only two 
company references were counted) in the Los Angeles Times sample, had an LQ 
of 8.01 but a smaller percentage (about 1.2%) of metro area employment.  No 
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other industry in the Los Angeles sample had an LQ greater than 2.  A weak 
correlation (34.9%, p = .02) was found between company references grouped by 
industry and the industries’ location quotients for the Los Angeles metro area.  
No statistically significant correlation was found between company references 
grouped by industries and the industries’ total percentages of employment, nor 
between industries’ location quotients and total percentages of employment in 
the Los Angeles MSA.
Table 5.2
Los Angeles Times Company References Grouped by Primary NAICS Code
Primary NAICS code References 
n = 634
% of 
references
Los Angeles % 
of employment
L.A. 
LQ
512 Motion picture and sound recording 
industries
334 Computer and electronics 
manufacturing
522 Credit intermediation and related 
activities
336 Transportation equipment 
manufacturing
515 Broadcasting
518 Internet service providers, Web search 
portals, and data processing services
5112 Software publishers
452 General merchandise stores
517 Telecommunications
519 Information services
87 13.72% 2.72% 7.82
69 10.88% 1.84% 1.78
53 8.36% 2.25% 0.94
52 8.20% 1.31% 1.05
50 7.89% 0.43% 1.56
45 7.10% 0.12% 0.54
35 5.52% 0.22% 0.88
29 4.57% 2.07% 0.74
26 4.10% 0.81% 0.95
22 3.47% 0.21% 1.59
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported employment data for several 
industries represented in the Chicago Tribune sample as non-disclosable.  A one-
sample T-test found that the Chicago sample of company references grouped by 
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industry—condensed to exclude industries with non-disclosable employment 
data—was statistically significant (p < .001).  Only one industry, air 
transportation (NAICS code 481), had an LQ greater than 2, reflecting Chicago’s 
status as a major airline hub.  No statistically significant correlation was found 
between the Chicago sample of company references grouped by primary NAICS 
code (Table 5.3) and the industries’ percentage of total employment, the sample 
of company references and industries’ location quotients, nor industries’ location 
quotients and percentage of total employment. 
Table 5.3
Chicago Tribune Company References Grouped by Primary NAICS Code
Primary NAICS References 
n = 476
% of 
references
Chicago % of 
employment
Chicago 
LQ
336 Transportation equipment 
manufacturing
481 Air transportation
522 Credit intermediation and related 
activities
334 Computer and electronics 
manufacturing
452 General merchandise stores
518 Internet service providers, Web 
search portals, and data processing 
services
517 Telecommunications
523 Securities, commodities contracts, 
and other financial investments and 
related activities
311 Food manufacturing
5112 Software publishers
47 9.87% 0.42% 0.33
41 8.61% 0.89% 2.1
39 8.19% 2.76% 1.16
37 7.77% 0.77% 0.75
31 6.51% 2.47% 0.88
29 6.09% N.D. N.D.
24 5.04% N.D. N.D.
23 4.83% 1.27% 1.69
19 3.99% 1.36% 1
18 3.78% 0.07% 0.3
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Researcher-Designated Industry Sectors
There were too few cases to conduct an ANOVA on the samples of 
researcher-designated industry sectors.  Paired-sample T-tests showed that the 
differences between the newspapers’ samples of company references grouped by 
researcher-designated industry sectors did not meet the standard of statistical 
significance (p = .930 for the San Jose Mercury News-Chicago Tribune pairing; 
p = .638 for the Mercury News-Los Angeles Times pairing; and p = .279 for the 
Los Angeles Times-Chicago Tribune pairing).  A one-sample T-test showed the 
San Jose Mercury News sample (Table 6.1) did not meet the standard of 
statistical significance (p = .245).  However, one-sample T-tests found statistical 
significance in the Los Angeles Times sample (p = .018) (Table 6.2) and the 
Chicago Tribune sample (p = .005) (Table 6.3).
Strong statistically significant (p < 0.01) correlations were found between 
the newspapers’ company reference samples.  The strongest correlation (86.4%) 
was found between the Mercury News and Chicago Tribune samples (p = 0.001),  
followed by the correlation between the Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune 
samples (81.9%, p = 0.002), and the correlation between the Mercury News and 
Los Angeles Times samples (78.5%, p = 0.004).  Such a result perhaps could be 
expected given an interest in technology news by news organizations and readers 
regardless of location.  However, the relevance of these correlations to the three 
hypotheses is ambiguous, particularly given the lack of statistical significance of 
the Mercury News sample.
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Table 6.1
San Jose Mercury News Company References
Grouped by Researcher-Designated Industry Sector
Researcher-designated  
industry sector
References 
n = 503
%
Tech 
Financial
Utilities
Retail/wholesale
Media
Other
Food
Transportation equipment
Oil
Airlines
Insurance
415 82.5%
23 4.6%
18 3.6%
15 3.0%
9 1.8%
7 1.4%
6 1.2%
5 1.0%
3 0.6%
1 0.2%
1 0.2%
Table 6.2
Los Angeles Times Company References
Grouped by Researcher-Designated Industry Sector
Researcher-designated  
industry sector
References 
n = 634
%
Tech
Media
Financial
Retail/wholesale
Transportation equipment
Other
Insurance
Food
Oil
Airlines
Utilities
215 33.9%
150 23.7%
73 11.5%
62 9.8%
52 8.2%
25 3.9%
16 2.5%
14 2.2%
14 2.2%
7 1.1%
6 0.9%
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Table 6.3
Chicago Tribune Company References
Grouped by Researcher-Designated Industry Sector
Researcher-designated   
industry sector
References 
n = 476
%
Tech
Financial
Retail/wholesale
Transportation equipment
Airlines
Media
Food
Other
Insurance
Oil
Utilities
146 30.7%
65 13.7%
60 12.6%
47 9.9%
41 8.6%
36 7.6%
33 6.9%
32 6.7%
8 1.7%
6 1.3%
2 0.4%
It was interesting to note that the technology sector, consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, by far dominated the proportion of company references (82.5%) in 
the Mercury News sample.  In addition, technology was the leading sector in the 
Los Angeles Times (33.9%) and Chicago Tribune (30.7%) samples, partly 
consistent with Hypothesis 3.  Media was the second-largest sector (23.7%) in the 
Los Angeles Times sample, partly consistent with Hypothesis 1.  However, 
stronger indicators of statistical significance would have been needed to draw any  
relevant conclusions based on this grouping of data.
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Discussion
In this study, some support for Hypothesis 1 was found.  Quantitative 
evidence showed that the presence of regional industrial agglomerations or 
business clusters has been accompanied by a substantial volume of news 
coverage of Silicon Valley’s technology industries in the San Jose Mercury News 
and of Hollywood’s entertainment industry in the Los Angeles Times.  Mixed 
support was found for Hypothesis 2 with evidence of a substantial volume of 
news coverage of Silicon Valley’s technology industries in the Los Angeles Times.  
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, however, little coverage of Hollywood’s entertainment 
industry was found in the Mercury News.  Mixed support was found for 
Hypothesis 3 with evidence of a substantial volume of news coverage in the 
Mercury News, Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune of Silicon Valley 
technology companies, especially larger companies with reputations as 
experienced frame-makers such as Apple, Google, and Facebook.
The strongest such evidence was found in the samples of company 
references grouped by parent company and by industry as defined by primary 
NAICS code.
Apple, Google, and Facebook were the largest sources of company 
references grouped by parent company in the Mercury News sample, which was 
dominated by large technology companies.  Apple, Google, and Facebook 
(although not necessarily in that order) also were among the 10 largest sources of 
company references grouped by parent company in the Los Angeles Times and 
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Chicago Tribune samples.  The Los Angeles Times sample was led by Disney, 
Time Warner, and Viacom, three of Bagdikian’s Big Five media conglomerates.  
All three companies have entertainment industry operations in Southern 
California and reputations as experienced frame-makers.  News Corp. and two 
other companies represented in Southern California’s motion picture industry 
also were among the 10 largest sources of company references grouped by parent 
company in the Los Angeles Times sample.  Google, Facebook, and Apple also 
were among the 11 largest sources of company references grouped by parent 
company in the Chicago Tribune sample, but this list also included two airline 
parent companies with hubs in Chicago and a technology-related startup with 
headquarters in the city, Groupon.
Grouped by NAICS code, five technology-related industries, computer and 
electronics manufacturers, Internet services, software publishers, 
telecommunications, and information services, accounted for more than 76% of 
company references in the Mercury News sample.  Notably, the most substantial 
employment agglomerations as measured by location quotient were found in 
Silicon Valley’s San Jose metro area, including an LQ of 13.12 for computer and 
electronics manufacturing and 16.44 for information services.  Although direct 
comparisons are not possible because the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not 
disclose proprietary employment data, San Jose had the strongest correlation 
between company references by industry and employment as measured both by 
LQ and industry percentage of total employment, based at least on disclosable 
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employment data.  Motion picture and sound recording industries, with an LQ of 
7.82 and about 2.7% of the region’s labor force, led the Los Angeles Times 
sample, although apparel manufacturing—an industry with a larger LQ but 
smaller percentage of the regional labor force—was not represented at all among 
the 10 industries with the most company references.  No statistically significant 
correlation between company references and employment was found in the 
Chicago Tribune sample.  The industry with the largest Chicago metro area 
location quotient, air transportation with an LQ of 2.1, was the second-largest 
source of company references.  The sample was led by transportation equipment 
manufacturing, an industry that includes automakers and aircraft maker Boeing, 
which has its headquarters in Chicago.  However, the industry had an LQ of 0.33, 
showing a much lower proportion of employment in the Chicago area compared 
with the national average.
Somewhat weaker support for the hypotheses was found in the samples of 
companies grouped by headquarters location.  The San Jose metro area was 
represented as either the largest source of company references in the Mercury 
News sample or at least tied for second-largest in the other two samples.  New 
York, where headquarters are located for most of the big media conglomerates 
with entertainment industry operations in Southern California, was the largest 
source of company references in the Los Angeles Times sample, and Chicago was 
the largest source of company references in the Chicago Tribune sample.  
However, the findings are somewhat ambiguous because the San Jose sample 
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was below the 95% confidence level for statistical significance that is standard in 
the social sciences, but above the 90% confidence level.  It is possible that a study 
with larger samples of company references in news stories would find greater 
support for the hypotheses.
The samples grouped by researcher-designated industry also produced 
ambiguous results because the Mercury News sample did not even meet the 90% 
confidence level for statistical significance.  Again, it is possible that a study with  
larger samples would produce relevant results.
Limitations of the Study
Several potential limitations of the study may have affected the findings.
As noted above, the sample of company references in business news 
stories in the Mercury News was not statistically significant at a 95% confidence 
level when grouped by location and researcher-designated industry.  It is possible 
that larger samples would have produced more statistically significant results.  
Although perhaps prohibitively time-consuming, full samples of company 
references in the three newspapers in the 12-month period would have been 
valid.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics employment data did not allow for direct 
comparisons of the potential relationship between company references and 
industry employment in the three metropolitan statistical areas where the San 
Jose Mercury News, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune are published.  
This is because the federal government does not disclose employment data when 
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it can be used to infer proprietary information such as the size of an individual 
company’s workforce, and incomplete data sets were available for the San Jose 
and Chicago metro areas.
This study also did not include a framing analysis of the news stories, an 
evaluation of whether coverage was favorable or unfavorable to the companies, or 
interviews with editors or reporters at the three newspapers to determine 
motivations for including references to companies in their news stories.
It also was a potential limitation of the study that the Mercury News 
sample included stories that were written by the researcher.
Implications and Suggestions for Further Research
In this study, support was found for a connection between the presence of 
a strong regional industrial agglomeration and the content of business news 
coverage in large daily newspapers in those regions.  Support also was found for 
an interest by news organizations of providing coverage of large technology 
companies such as Apple, Google, and Facebook regardless of location.
It was outside the scope of this study to determine whether it is good for 
readers and other community members to find a predominance of technology 
news in the San Jose Mercury News, a more balanced mix of coverage of the 
entertainment industry and other employment sectors in the Los Angeles Times, 
or the much more varied financial news coverage in the Chicago Tribune.  It’s 
possible that Mercury News editors have decided to emphasize coverage of the 
technology sector but are aware that with constrained resources they are 
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neglecting coverage of other important local business issues.  Without a 
predominant industry, editors at the Chicago Tribune might lack focus for their 
business news coverage decisions.  Further research could involve interviewing 
these editors about how they decide which companies to cover.  It also could 
involve interviewing or surveying readers and other community members to 
determine whether these editorial decisions meet their business news needs.
In addition, further research could include larger samples of stories from 
similar 12-month periods in the three newspapers as well as newspapers in other 
large metropolitan areas with employment concentrations such as Seattle or 
Detroit.  It also could be worthwhile to examine coverage of the technology and 
entertainment industries and other employment sectors with regional industrial 
agglomerations in national newspapers such as The New York Times and The 
Wall Street Journal.
Finally, it could be worthwhile to conduct a qualitative analysis of coverage 
in the three newspapers of the technology and entertainment industries with an 
emphasis on the success of message framing by large companies such as Apple, 
Google, Facebook, and Disney.  Additional insight into the effectiveness of 
message framing by these companies could be gained by interviewing editors and 
reporters involved in business news coverage and public relations practitioners 
who are experienced at framing corporate messages.
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Conclusion
The San Jose Mercury News is published in Silicon Valley, which is 
known for its cluster of innovative technology companies, including Apple, 
Google, and Facebook.  The Los Angeles Times is published in Southern 
California, home to Hollywood entertainment companies owned by giant media 
conglomerates such as Disney.  The Chicago Tribune is published in a 
metropolitan area that is one of the three largest in the country by population and 
an important global business center—but does not have a regional industrial 
agglomeration similar to Silicon Valley’s technology cluster or Hollywood’s 
entertainment industry.
In this study, business news coverage was examined in the three 
newspapers, recognizing—as Bagdikian (2004), Fortunato (2005), Gans (1979), 
and Johnson-Cartee (2005) have observed—that coverage decisions by news 
organizations are influenced by the communities they serve, that journalistic 
values can favor corporate interests, and that experienced frame-makers such as 
Apple, Google, Facebook, and Disney can be successful in conveying media 
messages.  Silicon Valley and Hollywood are two of the best-known examples of 
regional industrial agglomerations, or business clusters, which are a powerful 
form of organization for the deployment of capital and labor.  Silicon Valley and 
Hollywood have a substantial influence on the economy and culture in their 
regions.  They also have strong geographical and business links that affect 
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California’s economy and culture.  Known for their innovation and creativity, 
Silicon Valley and Hollywood also have transformed the global culture.
It was not surprising, then, to find quantitative data suggesting that Silicon 
Valley’s technology cluster was strongly reflected in business news coverage in 
the San Jose Mercury News, the region’s largest newspaper.  Hollywood’s 
entertainment industry also was reflected in business news coverage in the Los 
Angeles Times—but with a larger, more diverse economy in the Los Angeles area, 
other employment sectors had a notable presence.  In the Chicago Tribune, local 
employers were found in business news coverage, but to a lesser extent than in 
the Mercury News and Los Angeles Times. 
All three newspapers included substantial coverage of Silicon Valley 
technology companies, especially three well-known innovators—Apple, Google, 
and Facebook—that have transformed global culture and the business models of 
many established companies by changing the way professionals and consumers 
create and disseminate media content.
91
References
ABC (n.d.). ABC OTV online. Retrieved from http://abclocal.go.com/mediakit/
index.html
Aksoy, Asu & Robins, Kevin (1992). Hollywood for the 21st century: Global 
competition for critical mass in image markets. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 1992(16), 1-22.
Ayres, Robert U. & Williams, Eric (2004). The digital economy: Where do we 
stand? Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 71, 315-339.
Bagdikian, Ben H. (2004). The new media monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press.
Barlow, Aaron (2005). The DVD revolution: Movies, culture and technology.  
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Barnes, Brooks (2008a, February 2). Disney signs its chief to a new five-year 
contract. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/02/02/business/media/02disney.html
Barnes, Brooks (2008b, June 1). Disney and Pixar: The power of the prenup. The 
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/
business/media/01pixar.html
Bielby, William T. & Bielby, Denise B. (2003). Controlling prime-time: 
Organizational concentration and network television programming 
strategies. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 47(4), 573-596.
Bilton, Nick (2009, December 9). Cable freedom is a click away. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/technology/
personaltech/10basics.html
boyd, danah m. & Ellison, Nicole B. (2008). Social network sites: Definition, 
history, and scholarship. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 
13(1), 210-230. 
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver (2006). Cyberspace, globalization and empire. Global Media 
and Communication, 2(1), 21-41.
Bryman, Alan (1997). Animating the pioneer versus late entrant debate: an 
historical case study. Journal of Management Studies, 34(3), 415-438.
Bryman, Alan (1999). The Disneyization of society. The Sociological Review, 47
(1), 25-47.
92
Bui, CamLy (2010). How online gatekeepers guard our view: News portals’ 
inclusion and ranking of media and events. Global Media Journal, 9(16), 
1-41.
Carr, David (2010, May 3). A lost iPhone shows Apple’s churlish side. The New 
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/
business/media/03carr.html 
Catmull, Ed (2008). How Pixar fosters collective creativity. Harvard Business 
Review, September 2008, 65-72.
Chmielewski, Dawn (2010, February 9). Disney joins rush to embrace Apple’s 
iPad. Los Angeles Times Technology blog. Retrieved from http://
latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/02/disney-apple-ipad.html
Collis, David J. & Montgomery, Cynthia A. (2008). Competing on resources. 
Harvard Business Review, July-August 2008, 140-150.
Corliss, Richard (2010, September 24). The Social Network: A pie in the face for 
Zuckerberg. Time. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/arts/
article/0,8599,2021322,00.html
Davenport, Thomas H. & Harris, Jeanne G. (2009). What people want (and how 
to predict it). MIT Sloan Management Review, 50(2), 23-31.
Debatin, Bernhard; Lovejoy, Jennette P.; Horn, Ann-Kathrin; & Hughes, Brittany  
N. (2009). Facebook and online privacy: Attitudes, behaviors, and 
unintended consequences. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 15(1), 83-108.
Disney/ABC Television Group (2010). Disney/ABC Television Group’s ABC 
Player iPad app downloaded more than 212,000 times since the iPad’s 
April 3rd launch. Retrieved from http://www.disneyabctv.com/web/
NewsRelease/DispDNR.aspx?id=041410_07#
Dowling, Grahame & Weeks, Warren (2008). What the media is really telling you 
about your brand. MIT Sloan Management Review, 49(3), 28-34.
Fabrikant, Geraldine (1995, August 1). The media business: The merger; Walt 
Disney to acquire ABC in $19 billion deal to build a giant for 
entertainment. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://
www.nytimes.com/1995/08/01/business/media-business-merger-walt-
disney-acquire-abc-19-billion-deal-build-giant-for.html 
93
Fitzsimons, Gráinne M.; Chartrand, Tanya L.; & Fitzsimons, Gavan J. (2008). 
Automatic effects of brand exposure on motivated behavior: How Apple 
makes you think different. Journal of Consumer Research, 35(June), 
21-35.
Fortunato, John (2005). Making media content: The influence of constituency 
groups on mass media. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Gans, Herbert J. (1979). The messages behind the news. Columbia Journalism 
Review, January-February 1979, 40-45.
Gillespie, Tarleton (2006). Designed to ‘effectively frustrate’: Copyright, 
technology, and the agency of users. New Media and Society, 8(4), 
651-669.
Goggin, Gerard (2009). Adapting the mobile phone: The iPhone and its 
consumption. Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 23(2), 231-244.
Google (n.d.) Everything Google > Corporate information > Company (Web 
page). Retrieved from http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/corporate/
company/
Hassan, Amro & Fleishman, Jeffrey (2011, December 4). Egypt Islamist parties 
win more than 60% of the vote. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://
www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-egypt-elections-
revolutionaries-20111205,0,2989228.story
Haythornwaite, Caroline (2005). Social networks and Internet connectivity 
effects. Information, Communication, & Society, 8(2), 125-147.
Hearst (n.d.). Hearst newspapers (Web page). Retrieved from http://
www.hearst.com/newspapers/
Hebdige, Dick (2003). Dis-gnosis: Disney and the re-tooling of knowledge, art, 
culture, life, etc. Cultural Studies, 17(2), 150-167.
Henderson, Alison & Bowley, Rachel (2010). Authentic dialogue? The role of 
friendship in a social media recruitment campaign. Journal of 
Communication Management, 14(3), 237-257.
Hermida, Alfred (2010). Twittering the news. Journalism Practice, 4(3), 
297-308.
Hozic, Aida A. (1999). Uncle Sam goes to Siliwood: Of landscapes, Spielberg and 
hegemony. Review of International Political Economy, 6(3), 289-312.
94
Johnson, Mark W.; Christensen, Clayton M.; & Kagermann, Henning (2008). 
Reinventing your business model. Harvard Business Review, December 
2008, 51-59.
Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. (2005). News narratives and news framing: 
Constructing political reality. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Kelly, Jean (2009). Not so revolutionary after all: The role of reinforcing frames 
in U.S. magazine discourse about microcomputers. New Media and 
Society, 11(1&2), 31-52.
Kenski, Kate; Hardy, Bruce W.; & Hall Jamieson, Kathleen (2010). The Obama 
victory: How media, money, and message shaped the 2008 election. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kyser, Jack; Sidhu, Nancy D.; Ritter, Kimberly; & Guerra, Ferdinando (2010). 
L.A. Stats. Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles County Economic Development 
Corporation: The Kyser Center for Economic Research.
Lampel, Joseph & Shamsie, Jamal (2003). Capabilities in motion: New 
organizational forms and the reshaping of the Hollywood movie industry. 
Journal of Management Studies, 40(8), 2189-2210.
Lee, Micky (2011). Google ads and the blindspot debate. Media, Culture & 
Society, 33(3), 433-447.
Lessig, Lawrence (2004). Free culture: How big media uses technology and the 
law to lock down culture and control creativity. New York: The Penguin 
Press.
Lohr, Steve (2010, January 29). Steve Jobs and the economics of elitism. The 
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/
weekinreview/31lohr.html
Machill, Marcel & Beiler, Markus (2009). The importance of the Internet for 
journalistic research: A multi-method study of the research performed by 
journalists working for daily newspapers, radio, television, and online. 
Journalism Studies, 10(2) 178-203.
Markoff, John (2008, January 16). Enhancing its hits, Apple adds movie rentals, 
ultralight laptop. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/technology/16apple.html
95
Markoff, John & Holson, Laura (2005, October 13). With new iPod, Apple aims to 
be a video star. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/10/13/technology/13apple.html
MediaNews Group (n.d.). Our newspapers (Web page). Retrieved from http://
www.medianewsgroup.com/consumers/Pages/OurBrands.aspx
NBC Universal (n.d.). Company overview: NBC Universal Television Group 
(Web page). Retrieved from http://www.nbcuni.com/
About_NBC_Universal/Company_Overview/overview02.shtml
Newman, Bruce (2011, October 5). Obituary: Apple co-founder and Silicon Valley 
pioneer Steve Jobs is dead. San Jose Mercury News. Retrieved from 
http://www.mercurynews.com/obituaries/ci_19048827
News Corp. (n.d.). Fox TV stations (Web page). Retrieved from http://
www.newscorp.com/management/foxtvstations.html
Pan, Bing; Hembrooke, Helene; Joachims, Thorsten; Lorigo, Lori; Gay, Geri; & 
Granka, Laura (2007). In Google we trust: Users’ decisions on rank, 
position, and relevance. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 
12(3), 801-823.
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism (2010). When 
technology makes headlines: The media’s double vision about the digital 
age. Retrieved from http://www.journalism.org/analysis_report/
when_technology_makes_headlines
Porter, Michael E. (1998). Clusters and the new economics of competition. 
Harvard Business Review, November-December 1998, 77-90.
Preston, Jennifer (2011, November 24). Protesters look for ways to feed the Web. 
The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/11/25/business/media/occupy-movement-focuses-on-staying-
current-on-social-networks.html
Purcell, Kristen; Rainie, Lee; Mitchell, Amy; Rosenstiel, Tom; & Olmstead, Kenny  
(2010). Understanding the participatory news consumer: How internet 
and cell phone users have turned news into a social experience. Pew 
Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/
2010/Online-News.aspx
Rainie, Lee & Purcell, Kristen (2010). The economics of online news. Pew 
Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/
2010/5--The-economics-of-online-news/Media.aspx
96
Rysman, Marc (2009). The economics of two-sided markets. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 23(3), 125-143.
Shelton, Robert (2009). Integrating product and service innovation. Research-
Technology Management, 52(3), 38-44.
Scott, Allen J. (2004). The other Hollywood: The organizational and geographic 
bases of television-program production. Media, Culture & Society, 26(2), 
183-205.
Storper, Michael & Christopherson, Susan (1987). Flexible specialization and 
regional industrial agglomerations: The case of the U.S. motion picture 
industry. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 77(1), 
104-117.
Sumner, James (2007). What makes a PC? Thoughts on computer platforms, 
standards, and compatibility. IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 
April-June 2007, 87-88. 
Sundie, Jill M.; Gelb, Betsy D.; & Bush, Darren (2008). Economic reality versus 
consumer perceptions of monopoly. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 
27(2), 178-181.
Telotte, J.P. (2008). The mouse machine: Disney and technology. Urbana, IL 
and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Turner, Fred (2009). Burning Man at Google: A cultural infrastructure for new 
media production. New Media & Society, 11(1&2), 73-94.
Tribune (n.d.). Tribune company business units and websites (Web page). 
Retrieved from http://www.tribune.com/about/webguide/index.html
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d., a). Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (website). Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/cew/
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d., b). Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages: location quotient calculator (Web database). Retrieved from 
http://data.bls.gov/location_quotient/ControllerServlet
U.S. Census Bureau (n.d). North American Industry Classification System 
(website). Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/
Vishwanath, Arun (2009). From belief-importance to intention: The impact of 
framing on technology adoption. Communication Monographs, 76(2), 
177-206.
97
Vorvoreanu, Mihaela (2009). Perceptions of corporations on Facebook: An 
analysis of Facebook social norms. Journal of New Communications 
Research, 4(1), 67-86. 
Walt Disney Co. (n.d., a). Corporate information: Company overview (Web 
page). Retrieved from http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/
overview.html
Walt Disney Co. (n.d., b). Corporate information: Company history (continued) 
(Web page). Retrieved from http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/
complete_history_4.html
Walt Disney Co. (n.d., c). Corporate information: Company history (continued) 
(Web page). Retrieved from http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/
complete_history_7.html 
Weeks, Brian & Southwell, Brian (2010). The symbiosis of news coverage and 
aggregate online search behavior: Obama, rumors, and presidential 
politics. Mass Communication and Society, 13(4), 341-360.
West, Joel (2005). The fall of a Silicon Valley icon: Was Apple really Betamax 
redux? In Richard A. Bettis (Ed.) (2005), Strategy in transition (pp. 
274-301). Oxford: Blackwell. Retrieved from http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/
west_j/Papers/West2005.pdf
Wetlaufer, Suzy (2000). Common sense and conflict: An interview with Disney’s 
Michael Eisner. Harvard Business Review, January-February 2000, 
114-124.
98
